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Just in Crime:
Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Mary Kreiner Ramirez*
The collapse of Enron in the fall of 2001 left investors, creditors,
former employees, and legitimate business leaders asking whether the
bankruptcy' of the company was solely the product of bad business
practices or the consequence of criminal conduct. 2 Deregulation in the
energy and telecommunications industries, special access to politicians
through lawful generous campaign contributions, and civil litigation
"reforms" limiting private securities litigation permitted Enron's
* Mary Kreiner Ramirez is an Associate Professor of Law at Washburn University School of
Law and a former senior trial attorney for the United States Department of Justice, first with the
Antitrust Division and subsequently with the District of Kansas United States Attorney's Office.
This Article benefitted greatly from comments given at a presentation to the Washburn University
School of Law Faculty Scholarship Forum, organized by Professor Ronald Griffin. Additionally,
William Rich, Steve Willborn, Ellen Byers, and Steve Ramirez each provided excellent insights
that served to enhance this Article. Kari Nelson and Sherri Schuck provided outstanding research
assistance.
1. At the time of Enron's filing for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, it was the largest
corporate bankruptcy ever, with pre-bankruptcy assets, based on Securities and Exchange
Commission filings, of $63.4 billion. Tammy Williamson, Largest Bankruptcy, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 6481808. Within eight months of Enron's bankruptcy,
WorldCom eclipsed Enron as the largest bankruptcy filing in the history of the United States,
with listed assets valued at $107 billion, although some analysts believe the assets were worth
less than $15 billion at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Shawn Young et al., Leading the News:
WorldCom Filesfor Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at A3, available at 2002 WL-WSJ
3401243.
2. Rick Bragg, Enron's Collapse: Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs and Added Sting of Betrayal,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at LEX1S, News Library, The New York Times
File. Certainly, some of the acts that led to the energy giant's demise were lawful. In particular,
the use of the same internal auditor accounting firm to conduct the external audits raised the
eyebrows of the collective public but was not prohibited either by general accounting practices or
by law. Pamela Barnett, Corporate Reform Bill Headed to Bush, NAT'L J., July 27, 2002
(reviewing proposed legislation to address corporate accountability and accounting reform
legislation, which includes a proposal to establish an independent accounting oversight board and
severing auditing from consulting services), available at 2002 WL 7095409. The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 was passed on July 30, 2002 and did indeed include such provisions.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101-109, 116 Stat. 745, 750-71 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219) (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board); id. §§ 201209, 116 Stat. 745, 771-75 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7231-7234) (Auditor Independence).
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conduct to continue unabated by either government regulation or private
enforcement. The public stood as the shipmen on lookout on the
Titanic: it spied the tip of the iceberg and recognized that the iceberg
signaled trouble, but had no idea how large the iceberg might be.
Nevertheless, as the Enron debacle continued
to spread, some elements
3
light.
to
came
criminality
probable
of
The staggering economic losses from Enron's demise are reminiscent
of the insider trading scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, as well as the
Savings and Loans failures from that same period. 4 Michael Milken,
Ivan Boesky, and Charles Keating were financial giants when the
businesses with which they were involved collapsed under the weight of
questionable financial practices and personal financial self-dealing.
Plea agreements, departures from the Sentencing Guidelines, and
appeals resulted in the three each serving less than five years in prison,
despite their actions causing billions of dollars of losses to investors and
taxpayers. 5 History has a way of repeating itself,6 and one must
consider whether the corporate executives of today will fare as well as
the economic criminals of the past.
Recent changes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have focused
on appropriate sentencing of economic crime offenders like Milken,
3. For example, the sale of millions of dollars worth of Enron securities by senior executives
in the weeks and months before the collapse of the company's stock, with many Enron employees
losing their life savings invested in retirement plans dominated by Enron shares, prompted at least
four separate Congressional inquiries. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: Audacious Climb to
Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 1, at 1, available at LEXIS,
News Library, The New York Times File. The sales of stock occurred while the same insiders
continued to advocate the purchase of Enron stock to its employees. Executives instituted
policies that kept employees from selling their investments during time periods when significant
losses in shareholder value may have been anticipated; they also employed "creative" record
keeping which hid large business losses from shareholders and securities regulators. See Michael
A. Hiltzik & E. Scott Reckard, The Enron Inquiry: Enron Chairman Urged Employees to Buy
Stock, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at AI, available at 2002 WL 2447528.
4. See Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private Securities Litigation: Dealing
with the Meritorious as Well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1089-91 (1999)
(arguing against relaxing private civil remedies for securities fraud in light of the rampant
financial market fraud of the 1980s and 1990s).
5. See infra note 268 (discussing in more detail the individual results of the criminal
prosecutions).
6. In reaction to the Savings and Loans scandals, President George H. W. Bush promised,
"We will not rest until the cheats and chiselers and the charlatans spend a large chunk of their
lives behind the bars of a federal prison." Kitty Calavita & Henry N. Pontell, The State and
White-Collar Crime: Saving the Savings and Loans, 28 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 297, 301 (1994)
(citing to the speech given by President Bush to United States attorneys in June 1990). Twelve
years later, in a speech delivered at the signing into law of legislation to fight corporate fraud,
President George W. Bush warned, "No more easy money for corporate criminals-just hard
time." Mike Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms Into Law; President Says Era of 'False
Profits' Is Over, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WL 24824663.
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Boesky, and Keating.
Consolidation of competing guidelines,
consideration and clarification of loss calculations for the purpose of
measuring economic harm by such criminal conduct, and careful
explanation of sentencing enhancements and departures for such crimes
are all part of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing
Guidelines" or "Guidelines") 2001 Economic Crime Package, 7 effective
as of November 1, 2001.8 Concurrent amendments to the Money
Laundering Guidelines 9 address the disparity in white-collar crime
sentences based on prosecutorial discretionary authority over charging
decisions. Taken together, the amendments should provide greater
clarity to sentencing courts, uniformity in longer terms of imprisonment
for moderate and high levels of pecuniary harm, and specific deterrence
to economic crime offenders.
In response to the corporate and accounting scandals that began with
Enron, but appear to have no end in sight, the legislature attempted to
restore faith in America's financial markets by enacting new criminal
t0
statutes and mandating stiffer penalties for economic crimes.
Specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the result of a series
of scandals and the precipitous decline of investor confidence in the
summer of 2002. Included in the legislation were directives for the
United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commission") to
promulgate any amendments to the Guidelines necessary to effect the
purposes of the legislation and, in particular, to "reflect the serious
nature" of corporate fraud.''
This Article lauds the United States Sentencing Commission for the
dramatic undertaking that culminated in the Economic Crime Package.
This Article addresses two Guidelines-related issues that will impact
sentencing of the new millennium's economic criminals: first, whether
substantive changes in the Sentencing Guidelines based on the new
7. U.S. SENTFNCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (and scattered provisions throughout)
(2002) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]: id. app. C, amend. 617, at 134-91.
8. Guideline amendments are effective only as to criminal conduct that occurred on or after
the effective date of the amendments or charged criminal conduct that began before and
continued after the effective date of the revised Guidelines. To the extent that criminal conduct
by Enron executives occurred prior to November I, 2001, much of the amendments will not
technically apply. U.S.S.G. § I B 1.11 (b)( I). (3). Nevertheless, to the extent that the amendments
better define terms like "loss" to resolve splits in circuit court interpretations of such terms under
the Guidelines, courts are directed to "consider subsequent amendments, to the extent such
amendments are clarifying rather than substantive changes." Id. § IB 1.1 l(b)(2).
9. Id. § 2S1.1.
10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 801-1107, 116 Stat. 745, 800-10
(to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
II. Id. § 905(b)(l), 116 Stat. 745. 805: id. § 1104(b)(l), 116 Stat. 745. 809 (to be codified at
28 U.S.C. § 994 note).
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legislation are needed given the recently adopted Economic Crime
Package; and second, whether the increased trend in downward
departures under the Guidelines can be curbed to affect the nature of the
Economic Crime Package and corporate fraud reforms in light of the
broad discretion12permitted sentencing judges as acknowledged by the
Supreme Court.
This Article considers the application of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines to current economic crime. Part I reviews the historical
development of the Guidelines, particularly the treatment of economic
crime. 13 Part II considers the likely effect of the 2001 Economic Crime
Package on future economic crime sentences, including the
countervailing effects of the Money Laundering Guidelines
amendments. 14 Given the extensive changes to the sentencing of whitecollar criminals under the 2001 Economic Crime Package, Part II also
questions the sagacity of promulgating substantive changes to the Fraud
and Theft Guideline in response to legislative action on corporate and
accounting fraud. 15
Part III identifies the continued threat of
unwarranted downward departures under the Guidelines, both through
16
substantial assistance departures and judicially imposed departures.
Finally, Part IV examines whether movement toward longer
17
incapacitation is justified in light of the availability of civil remedies.
Milken, Boesky, Keating, and now, perhaps, the former officers of
Enron, Adelphia, 18 and WorldCom 19 all demonstrate the need for
12. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
13. See infra Part I (providing a history of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
14. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing the goals and effects of the 2001 Economic Crime
Package and the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986).
15. See infra Part II.C (describing penalties for white-collar crime).
16. See infra Part III (discussing the role of judges in determining departures from the
Guidelines and the threat of those departures to the effectiveness of sentences).
17. See infra Part IV (providing suggestions for reforming white-collar criminal penalties).
18. See Daniel Eisenberg, Jail to the Chiefs?, TIME. Aug. 12, 2002, at 24 (reporting early
morning "perp walks" for WorldCom executives Scott Sullivan and David Myers upon their
arrest for corporate fraud, only a week after Adelphia Communications' founder and his two sons
received similar "star treatment"), available at 2002 WL 21959750.
19. WorldCom filed for bankruptcy one month after it announced the need to restate earnings
for 2001 and the first quarter of 2002 because it misstated $3.8 billion in expenses to mask a $1.2
billion loss for that same period. Young et al., supra note 1, at A3. The earnings and expense
manipulation has been described as "what could turn out to be the biggest accounting fraud ever."
Id. Bernard Ebbers, WorldCom's CEO during the period of fraudulent accounting practices, was
ousted in April 2002 after the financial irregularities became apparent. Id. Prior to his departure
from the company, Ebbers had received a $408 million loan from WorldCom. Id. Market
capitalization for WorldCom had dropped to $280 million at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Id.
WorldCom employees had noted accounting irregularities as early as 2000, a fact noted by
congressional committees probing WorldCom's financial fiasco. Upheaval at WorldCom:
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deterrence. Currently, either because of deregulation or litigation
"reform," the civil deterrence matrix is insufficient.20 History has
shown that it is not just the consumers, the investors, and the employees
who are harmed. The business community itself cannot function with
companies like Enron slowly eroding the confidence in our financial
markets. 2 1 While the revisions to the fraud section of the Guidelines are
a start, this Article suggests that the use of downward departures in
economic crime cases must be restricted to rare instances when the
Sentencing Guidelines do not adequately take into account
extraordinary circumstances. In that vein, this Article sets forth a
"guided" departure scheme for sentencing economic crimes so that the
basis for departure is not permitted to alter the sentencing range by
more than a fraction of the overall term of imprisonment.2 2 Having
locked the front door through the Economic Crime Package, we must
now turn our attention to closing the backdoor.

Congress Calls for Documents of 2 Employees, WALL ST. J.. July 22, 2002, at A6, available at
2002 WL-WSJ 3401223. Executives at WorldCom have been criminally charged. See infra note
21 and accompanying text (discussing the poor image of the business world in the wake of the
WorldCom collapse).
20. See Ramirez, supra note 4, at 1089-93 (urging more stringent civil remedies for securities
fraud). The threat of traditional civil remedies has failed to restrain corporate leaders, whose
interest in short-term personal profit has overshadowed their interest in sound accounting
practices and long-term corporate profit. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Enron's Many' Strands:
Capital Rule Makers; Democrats Try to Surpass Bush in Tough Post-Enron Fraud Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2002, at CI ("'Enron has shown more than anything that the arsenal of weapons
to prevent securities fraud is lacking."' (quoting Professor Donald C. Langervoort of the
Georgetown University Law Center)), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times
File.
21. "1 cannot think of a time when business over all has been held in less repute." Henry M.
Paulson, Jr., chairman and chief executive officer of Goldman Sachs, quoted in Patrick
McGeehan, Goldman Chief Urges Reforms in Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at Al,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. Indeed, on the heels of
WorldCom's admission of significant losses hidden by falsely reported profits over five previous
quarters, foreign investors began withdrawing from United States markets. Edmund L. Andrews,
Turmoil at WorldCom: The Overseas Reaction; U.S. Businesses Dim as Model for Foreigners,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at Al (reporting the lowest level of the dollar, compared to the euro,
in twenty-eight months), available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File.
Wolfram Gerdes, chief investment officer for global equities at Dresdner Investment Trust in
Frankfurt, Germany, stated, "This is the most pessimistic sentiment against the United States that
I have ever experienced in my career.... There is unanimous agreement that the U.S. is not the
best place to invest anymore." Id.
22. See infra Part IV.D (providing guidance for departures from the Guidelines).
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

A. HistoricalDevelopment of the Sentencing Reform Act
The Sentencing Reform Act of 198423 ("SRA") was the result of over
a decade of legal wrangling to reform federal criminal law. 24 Although
initially proposed as advisory sentencing guidelines, amendments
resulted in a system of presumptive sentencing rules in 1978.25 After
having been debated over in four Congresses, between 1977 and 1984,26
the SRA was finally passed through legislative fiat when it was attached
to the Senate's version of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act17 in a
continuing appropriations resolution.28 Prior to its enactment, the SRA
enjoyed broad political support from leading members of both political
The SRA created a
parties 29 and little opposition from the judiciary.
3 1 to develop the Sentencing Guidelines. The
Sentencing Commission
23. Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3552, 3554-3559 (2000 &
West Supp. 2002); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000 & West Supp. 2002), amended by 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Act, No. 107-273, § 4002(a)(8), 116 Stat. 1758, 1807
(2002); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
24. KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 39-48 (1998).
25. Id. at 41.
26. Id. at 40.
27. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
28. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 47.
29. Id. at 39, 46-47. The "liberal" side of the aisle was concerned that the disparity in
sentencing might reflect conscious or unconscious discrimination against minority groups and
women. See Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice?: The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on
Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1331, 1339 (1999) (discussing
influences on sentencing reform). The "conservative" side of the aisle was concerned with
getting tough on crime, which was viewed as an increasing problem. See STITH & CABRANES,
supra note 24, at 39-40.
30. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 251-57 (1993)
(arguing that the judicial branch had little impact on sentencing reform). In 1973, Judge Marvin
E. Frankel called for an end to discretionary sentencing. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5-6 (1973) (advocating an end to indeterminate sentencing
in reaction to the disparity in federal sentences and the lack of predictability in sentencing
outcomes).
31. "The United States Sentencing Commission ('[Sentencing] Commission') is an
independent agency in the judicial branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex
officio members." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A. 1. The commissioners serve staggered terms of six years
each. 28 U.S.C. § 992 (2000). The voting members are appointed by the President, with Senate
confirmation, and include three federal judges selected by the President "after considering" a list
of six judges submitted by the Judicial Conference. Id. § 991(a). The Attorney General or his or
her designee and the Chairman of the United States Parole Commission sit as ex officio members.
Id. The SRA prospectively abolished parole; consequently, the parole commission position is
only temporary. See Parole Commission Phaseout Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-232, §§ 1-3, 110
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original Commissioners, confirmed in 1985,32 were charged with
developing 33the Sentencing Guidelines to achieve three congressional
objectives.
The first objective was "honesty in sentencing," that is, imposing a
sentence that would reflect the actual amount of time an offender could
expect to be imprisoned. 34 This objective was in response to the preGuidelines system of indeterminate sentencing. With indeterminate
sentencing, a judge sentenced a convicted offender either to a particular
number of years or to a range of years. 35 Once sentenced, the
offender's fate lay in the hands of administrative bodies. The criminal
sentences were often shortened by as much as two-thirds as a result of
either "good time" credits 36 against the sentences or the decisions of the
United States Parole Commission 37 permitting early release.
The second objective sought was "reasonable uniformity in
sentencing," which would narrow the disparity in sentences for similar
criminal conduct by similar offenders. 38 In the pre-Guidelines era, the
sentencing judge had unlimited discretion to impose any sentence that
Stat. 3055, 3055-56 (extending the period that parole remains in effect after Nov. 1, 1987, to
fifteen years) (setting the number of members on the Parole Commission at five), amended by
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 11231(d), Il1 Stat. 251, 745-46 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (2000)); Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98473, § 218(a)(5), 98 Stat. 1837, 2027; Stith & Koh, supra note 30, at 280 & n.361.
32. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 49.
33. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.3.
34. Id.
35. See Frank 0. Bowman III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 302 n.12 (2000) (summarizing the
three options available to a district court when imposing a sentence of imprisonment, as follows:
the court could set a maximum term of imprisonment (1) of which the offender would be required
to serve one-third before being eligible for parole (18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (2000) (repealed 1984));
or (2) which specified a minimum term that was less than one-third of the maximum (ld.
§ 4205(b)(1) (repealed 1984)); or (3) which specified that the Parole Commission may determine
when the prisoner may be released on parole (Id. § 4205(b)(2) (repealed 1984))) [hereinafter
Bowman, Fearof Law].
36. "Good time" credits were a statutory entitlement that permitted prisoners to receive a
reduction of up to nearly one-third of a stated sentence for good behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 4161
(repealed 1984). Federal inmates may still earn good time credits under the current system;
however, the rate of accumulation is much lower. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2000).
37. In 1930, Congress created the United States Board of Parole, which later became the
United States Parole Commission. See DON M. GOTrFREDSON ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE
AND SENTENCING 2 (1978). The statutes that set forth the powers of the Parole Commission were
in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (repealed 1984). Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 35, at 302 n.l1.
Prior to 1930, each federal prison had its own parole board, which had discretionary power to
release any prisoner who served one-third of his original stated sentence so long as the board was
satisfied that "there [was] a reasonable probability" that the prisoner could "remain at liberty
without violating the laws." Id. (quoting Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387 § 3, 36 Stat. 819. 819).
38. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.3.
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fell at or below the statutory maximum for that particular crime.
Moreover, no limitation existed on the type of information the court
could receive or consider in assessing the sentence to be imposed,3 9 nor
was the court required to issue findings indicating which factors led to a
particular sentencing decision. 40 As long as a district court's sentence
did not violate broad notions of due process, it was unreviewable on
appeal. 4 ' Congress provided for 4limited
appellate jurisdiction to review
2
federal sentences under the SRA.
The Sentencing Guidelines were enacted to address disparity in
sentencing.43 Sentences before the enactment of the Guidelines tended
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.").
40. See Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 35, at 303-04 (discussing the breadth of a
sentencing judge's discretion).
41. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines system, a federal
criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on
appeal."); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (stating "the general proposition
that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under
which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end"); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449
(1972) (vacating sentence on due process grounds Where court relied upon prior uncounseled
convictions in sentencing); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 (2d Cir. 1952)
(recognizing the precedent of the trial court's discretion); PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM 3 (1977) (quoting the appellate court's finding in
Rosenberg that it "'ha[d] no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a
statute"'); see also Stith & Koh, supra note 30, at 226 ("For over two hundred years, there was
virtually no appellate review of the trial judge's exercise of sentencing discretion."); Stanley A.
Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 89
(1988) (noting the extent of judicial discretion in sentencing prior to the SRA). Under the SRA,
sentences imposed by the district courts are subject to appellate review. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (b)
(2000).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000).
43. The Sentencing Guidelines have no shortage of critics. In particular, some commentators
assert that although the Guidelines give lip service to the theoretical justifications for punishment,
the application of the Guidelines to individuals is rigid, and the preference for imprisonment is
often harsh. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 82-85 (likening the sentencing process
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Kafka's parable, in which "the real power of the court
has receded into an impenetrable state agency"); Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful
Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 59-60 (2000) (discussing the inflexible nature of the Guidelines);
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1718-20 (1992) (asserting that rigidity of the
Guidelines has caused the actors in the criminal process to seek out intentional disparity in
sentencing); Nancy Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 HUM. RTS. 6, 7-8, 23 (2002)
(criticizing the Sentencing Commission for not providing justification for changes to the
Guidelines); Lawrence S. Lustberg, The Importance of Purposesin Choosing Between Prison and
Probation, 3 FED. SENT. REP. 334, 334 (1991) (criticizing the Guidelines for assuming that
incarceration will be imposed); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process:
The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 861-63 (1992) (discussing
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to be harsher for crimes frequently committed by offenders in lower
socio-economic backgrounds, compared to sentences for "white-collar"
crimes that frequently included little, if any, imprisonment. 44 Even as
the Sentencing Guidelines attempted to eliminate racial and socioeconomic effects, Congress effectively widened the gap in some areas,
most notably the sentencing disparity between offenders convicted of
cocaine offenses compared to offenders convicted of crack-cocaine
offenses for which the ratio of drug quantity for purposes of sentencing
is 100:1. 45
Sentencing statistics reveal that an overwhelming
the Guidelines' inflexibility toward departures); Stith & Koh, supra note 30, at 267-69, 284-85
(discussing the increase in prison terms as a result of sentencing reforms); Michael Tonry,
Salvaging the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SENT. REP. 355, 356 (1992)
(criticizing the rigidity of the Guidelines). But see Frank 0. Bowman III, The Quality of Mercy
Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the FederalSentencing Guidelines,
1996 Wis. L. REV. 679, 719-20, 736-40 (supporting the predictability of the Guidelines)
[hereinafter Bowman, Quality of Mercy]; William W. Wilkins, Jr., et al., Competing Sentencing
Policies in a "War on Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 326-27 (1993) (concluding
that the Guidelines have been a successful innovation in reducing unwanted disparity).
This Article focuses on the application of recent economic crime reform measures to address
economic crime. While the critics of the Sentencing Guidelines raise numerous legitimate
concerns, Judge Frankel's observation that "[tihe idea of... guidelines was not meant nor
expected to remedy every defect in our sentencing practices" should be kept in mind. Marvin E.
Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and Guidelines, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 655 (1993) (providing basic principles of sentencing). Aggressively
punitive laws by our legislatures, intended to showcase their "tough on crime" stance, see Marie
Gottschalk, Review Article: Black Flower: Prisonsand the Future of Incarceration,582 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 195, 207-11 (2002), has led to the ignominious distinction for the
United States as having the highest incarceration rate among developed countries, Frankel &
Orland, supra, at 655; see also ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS AND PROBATION § 1.01, at 4 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that the high rate of incarceration
in the United States surpasses that of all other developed countries). The Sentencing Commission
has attempted, at times, to deflect or suggest correction of this trend.
44. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.4(d); see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 106-12 (providing a
critical view of the assessment of disparity in pre-Guidelines sentencing).
45. For example, the Guidelines provide the same base offense level of thirty-eight for both a
defendant convicted of possession of 150 kilograms or more of cocaine and a defendant convicted
of possession of 1.5 kilograms or more of cocaine base (that is, crack cocaine). U.S.S.G.
§ 2Dl.l(c)(1). For an eye-opening description of the legislative history of crack-cocaine
sentencing, see David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1293-98 (1995). Judge Frankel's observation made over twenty-five years ago that
"[mlany of our criminal laws are enacted in an access of righteous indignation, with legislators
fervidly out-shouting each other, with little thought or attention given to the large numbers of
years inserted as maximum penalties" holds true today. See FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 9.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also supports Judge Frankel's observation. Increased
statutory maximums for mail fraud and wire fraud were first proposed to double from five years
to ten years. See Floyd Norris, Corporate Conduct: Hard Talk, Softer Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. As reports of
additional corporate misdeeds surfaced and the stock market tumbled, politicians embraced the
quadrupling of the maximum terms from five years to twenty years. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 805 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 note).
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percentage of crack-cocaine offenders are black4 6 and that the offenders
of economic crime are overwhelmingly white. 47 Comparing these
statistics 4 8 to those of the general prison population supports the notion
that race may still be a factor in sentencing; however, it is now codified
in the Sentencing Guidelines because through determinate sentencing
the legislature can target particular crimes and more narrowly define the
parameters of sentences. 4 9 Thus, targeting certain crimes through
mandatory minimum sentences or punishing more harshly certain nonviolent crimes that are more frequently committed by minorities are
decisions by the legislature embedded within
the Guidelines in the base
50
crimes.
those
to
assigned
levels
offense
Finally, as its third objective, Congress sought "proportionality in
sentencing," by implementing a system in which criminal conduct of
varying degrees of severity would be appropriately sentenced. 5 1 This
Senator Phil Gramm, the sole dissenting voice as House and Senate conferees prepared to vote on
the compromise bill, complained that the bill was "too inflexible for business," stating, "I want to
make it clear that this bill could have been a lot worse ....
In the environment that we're in,
virtually anything could have passed the Congress." David S. Hilzenrath et al., How Congress
Rode a "Storm" to Corporate Reform, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at Al (describing the swift
passage of the Sarbanes bill, made stronger on the Senate floor with new penalties for financial
fraud), available at 2002 WL 24823954. The bill passed in the House with a 423-3 vote, and the
Senate approved it 99-0. Allen, supra note 6.
46. In 1995, the United States Sentencing Commission recommended to Congress an
amendment to the Guidelines that would reduce sentencing disparity for possession of cocaine
and cocaine base in the Drug Quantity Table of the Guidelines. Congress affirmatively
disapproved the amendment. Act of Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334, 334
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note (2000)); see also KLEIN, supra note 43, § 1.01, at 3 (presenting
statistical information to support the claim that the drug crimes "punished most severely are those
most available to and used by minorities").
47. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 14 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK].
48. While one might be tempted to make the argument that the over-sentencing of non-violent
drug crimes does not necessarily support the position that white-collar sentencing is out of
alignment, the corollary to that argument is that the over-sentencing of non-violent drug offenders
is evidence of a sentencing system out of alignment with proportionality principles. See, e.g.,
Frank 0. Bowman III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of
Declining FederalDrug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1127-34 (2001) (discussing possible
explanations for the decline in drug sentences).
49. See KLEIN, supra note 43, § 1.01, at 1-8.
50. Id. § 1.01, at 3-4, 7-8. But see William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1795, 1795-98 (1998) (asserting that disproportionate punishment for drug crimes may
appear racist but is actually paternalistic in that it seeks to protect urban minorities from the havoc
wreaked on their communities by the drug trade).
51. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.3. Unlike many state sentencing guideline schemes, the
Sentencing Guidelines do not place all categories of crime into an overall classification scheme,
such as Class 1 felonies being the most serious felony offenses, Class 2 felonies being secondary
in seriousness, and so forth. Moreover, Congress routinely ignores proportionality by passing
legislation that reacts to the crime of the week rather than legislation that interacts with the
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objective has led to extensive criticism that the Guidelines are too
complex and cumbersome. 52 Given the wide range of criminal conduct
punishable by federal statute, 53 the Sentencing Commission strove to
arrive at a sentencing scheme that could take into account the diversity
of various crimes. 5 4 The Sentencing Commission sought to meet this
goal of proportionality by separating the crimes into categories, 55 such
as offenses against the person, offenses involving property, and offenses
involving drugs.
The categories were separated further into
56
subcategories, including homicide, assault, and criminal sexual abuse.
Once a category was broken down into subcategories, a numeric base
level was assigned. The Sentencing Commission provided for that base
level to be adjusted upward or downward, depending on specific
characteristics of the offense, 57 and included victim-related, role-in-theoffense-related obstruction of justice, as well as acceptance of
responsibility adjustments.5 8
Finally, the Sentencing Commission
factored the offender's prior criminal history into the sentencing
analysis by placing the adjusted number, known as the "offense level,"
on the vertical axis of a sentencing table grid,5 9 in which the horizontal

current sentencing guideline scheme. Professor Frank Bowman has described the effect on
proportionality as seemingly "whimsical." Frank 0. Bowman III, The 2001 Federal Economic
Crime Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5, 18 (2001)
[hereinafter Bowman, 2001 Reforms]. The increase in maximum sentences for mail fraud and
wire fraud under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is another example of reactive legislation. See
infra notes 146-47 (discussing the effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on maximum sentencing
guidelines).
52. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 3, 91. The Guidelines have been compared to
the tax code in complexity. Id. at 3.
53. See U.S.S.G. app. A; Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 17 (identifying "roughly
970 criminal statutes" prescribing federal criminal penalties within the Sentencing Guidelines).
54. "Simple uniformity-sentencing every offender to five years-destroys proportionality."
U.S.S.G. ch. I, pt. A.3. See generally Sir Leon Radzinowicz & Roger Hood, Judicial Discretion
and Sentencing Standards: Victorian Attempts to Solve a PerennialProblem, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1288 (1970) (describing Victorian efforts to consolidate the hodge-podge of statutes and common
law that changed the body of English law into a single collection of criminal law).
55. The Guidelines provide "Application Instructions" which explain how to calculate an
offense level for a particular offender. U.S.S.G. § IBI.I.
A concise description of the
application of the Guidelines is set out in Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 35, at 305-09, 358
nn.28-50. For an illustration of how the Guidelines are used to calculate an offender's sentence,
see Steven Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1988) [hereinafter Breyer, Key Compromises].
56. See U.S.S.G. ch. 2, pt. A.1-3.
57. Id.
58. See id. ch. 3, pts. A-E.
59. Id. ch. 5, pt. A.
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axis reflected the prior criminal history of the offender.
The point at
which a perpetrator's offense level intersected with the prior criminal
history level corresponded to a sentencing range 6 1 for that individual.
The higher the offense level number or the more extensive the criminal
history, the longer the mandated sentencing range. 62 With the
sentencing table in place, the Sentencing Commission could better
gauge similar characteristics of crimes, such as violence or criminal
history, on a single scale, while creating distinct areas that could be
tailored as experience with application of the Guidelines might later
necessitate.
B. Incorporatingthe Purposes of Sentencing
into the FederalSentencing Scheme
Key to attaining the objectives of the Guidelines was the aim for
certainty 63 and fairness 64 in sentencing; "justice must not only be done,
but must appear to be done." 65 Congress statutorily required that in
determining the appropriate sentences under the Sentencing Guidelines,
the Sentencing Commission was to take into account the purposes of
sentencing.66 Thus, in determining the particular sentence to be
60. See generally id. ch. 4 (defendant's past record of criminal conduct relevant to
sentencing); id. ch. 5,pt. A, cmt. n.I (intersection of offense level and criminal history displays a
guideline range in months of imprisonment).
61. The sentencing range is limited by the 25% rule: The maximum of any range cannot
exceed the minimum by more than the greater of 25% or six months. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2)
(2000), amended by 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, § 11008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819 (2002).
62. See infra notes 164-83, 219, 221 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
under which the sentencing court can depart from this sentencing range).
63. Even when convicted, white-collar offenders receive fewer sentences and shorter terms of
imprisonment than non-violent common criminals. Among white-collar offenders, antitrust
violators (at the upper end of the social strata of white-collar criminals) receive the most lenient
sentences. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR
OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 130-32 (1991).
64. While the commissioners were seeking to develop the fairest system possible, nothing in
the Guidelines could alter one factor that has influenced the outcome of nearly all criminal cases
from the outset of the judicial system in this country: the benefit of good legal counsel. Whitecollar offenders enjoy that benefit at the earliest point in their cases. One study found that when
compared to common crimes, 60% of white-collar offenders retain private counsel, whereas only
16% of common criminals are so represented. Id. at 100-01. This statistic is not to disparage
appointed counsel in any manner. Appointed counsel, however, does not come into the legal play
until the offender is arrested or charges have been brought against him. The goal of defense
counsel in white-collar cases is to prevent charges from being filed at all. KENNETH MANN,
DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATITORNEYS AT WORK 9-10 (1985).
65. See FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 24.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & West Supp. 2002). This Article takes the position that
economic crimes have been under-punished and that the Sentencing Commission's Economic
Crime Package is a considered and measured response to deter a recurring problem.
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imposed, the courts must consider, among other things, "the need for
the sentence imposed ... [t]o provide just punishment for the
offense; ... afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;...
[p]rotect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and...
[p]rovide... educational [training],... vocational training, ....
medical
care, . . . or other correctional treatment. ' 67 Prior to the Guidelines,
retributive and utilitarian purposes of sentencing had been longrecognized as appropriate considerations in sentencing; 6 8 however, they
had not been codified as a cohesive plan for sentencing. Pre-Guidelines
sentencing determinations did not require federal district judges to
consider or identify 69 which, if any, justifications for punishment the
sentence aimed to achieve. By acknowledging that each of the purposes
was worthy of consideration, the Sentencing Commission recognized
that, as to the competing philosophies 70 underlying the purposes of
punishment, different
purposes have greater or lesser value with
7
different defendants. 1

67. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
68. SANDFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES,
CASES AND MATERIALS 101, 134 (7th ed.2001).
69. See FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 7, 38.
70. See Breyer, Key Compromises, supra note 55, at 15-18 (stating that when faced with
advocates of deterrence and those of "just deserts," listing criminal behavior in rank order of
severity and applying punishment, the Sentencing Commission focused on typical, or average,
actual past practice in punishment).
71. Indeed, when it comes to deterrence, criminologists frequently consider the "backfire"
effect of some punishments, particularly imprisonment. While one offender may find a short
prison sentence to be an effective deterrent to future criminal behavior, another offender may find
that having served the prison sentence has removed the "fear factor" of facing prison. Thus, with
nothing to lose, the second offender might as well continue the criminal behavior postimprisonment. See DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS
91-92 (2001); see also Ted Bartell & L. Thomas Winfree, Jr., Recidivist Impact of Differential
Sentencing Practices for Burglary Offenders, 15 CRIMINOLOGY 387-96 (1977) (finding
probation more likely to deter future incarceration than imprisonment in burglary offenses, which
was recognized for a high rate of recidivism).
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C. Establishing "White-Collar"72 Sentences
The underlying concern of proportionality begs the question of which
crimes are to be punished more severely and which, therefore, should
have higher offense levels assigned to them. In setting base-level
offenses, the Sentencing Commission used historical sentencing
patterns as a starting point. 73 The Sentencing Commission then
72. Edwin H. Sutherland, a criminologist/sociologist coined the term "white-collar" in 1939.
Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. Soc. REV. 1, I (Feb. 1940) (discussing
the crimes committed by those in the upper or white-collar class versus crimes committed by
those in the lower classes); see also TONY G. POVEDA, RETHINKING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 31
(1994); EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983)
(defining white-collar crime as "crime committed by a person of respectability and high social
status in the course of his occupation"); Edwin H. Sutherland, Is "White-Collar Crime" Crime?,
10 AM. Soc. REV. 132, 137-39 (Apr. 1945) (noting that the criminality of white-collar crimes is
blurred by special procedures in enforcement, punishment, or "lack of moral culpability" that
reduces the stigma of white-collar crime).
However, definitions of the term vary. See David 0. Friedrichs, White-Collar Crime and the
Definitional Quagmire: A ProvisionalSolution, 3 J. HUM. JUST. 5 (1992); Gilbert Geis, WhiteCollar Crime: What is It?, in WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 31 (Kip Schlegel & David
Weisburd eds., 1992) (discussing the origin and evolution of the definition of "white-collar"); see
also Elizabeth Szockyj, Imprisoning White-Collar Criminals?, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 485, 486-87
(1999) (noting that not only do the definitions of "white-collar crime" vary, but the harm inflicted
by white-collar crime varies as well in that it may be financial, physical, or social). An academic
workshop co-sponsored by the National White-Collar Crime Center and West Virginia University
took three days to reach a definitional consensus that white collar crime is "[i]llegal or unethical
acts that violated fiduciary responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual or
organizations, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of high or
respectable social status for personal or organizational gain." NAT'L WHITE COLLAR CRIME
CTR., PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMIC WORKSHOP: WHITE COLLAR CRIME DEFINITIONAL
DILEMMAS 33 (1996).
The Sentencing Guideline Manual does not identify particular crimes as "white-collar." The
2000 Sourcebook provides some statistics using "white collar offenses" as a category label.
Included in that category are the following offense types: fraud, embezzlement,
forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering. See Average Length of
Imprisonment in Each General Crime Category, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 32 n. I
fig.E; Distribution of Offenders in Each Primary Offense Category, Fiscal Year 2000, 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at II n. I fig.A.
Antitrust offenses inexplicably are not included. See id. Presumably, antitrust, tax fraud,
securities fraud, and insider trading should be included. Indeed, the most difficult problem with
the term "white collar" is that no single definition is widely accepted, so the list of white-collar
crimes can be cast either narrowly to include only the above or widely to include telemarketers
and credit card fraud.
The changes to the Sentencing Guidelines that are addressed in this Article do not depend upon
a precise definition of "white-collar crime." The Guidelines base imprisonment levels for
economic crimes on the degree of either loss to the victim or gain to the offender. See infra Part
II (identifying and discussing the 2001 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines). This Article
uses the term "white-collar crime" interchangeably with the term "economic crime."
73. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.3; Breyer, Key Compromises, supra note 55, at 7 (noting that the
Sentencing Commission was guided by past practice when it created categories and determined
sentence lengths); see also STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING
OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 160-63, 192-93 (1988); Steven Breyer, Justice Breyer: Federal
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adjusted these historical bases to reflect Congress's concerns 74 that
crime was out of control and that greater punishment was needed, as
well as the concerns of the Sentencing Commission that white-collar
crimes were grossly under-sentenced.7 5
The Sentencing Commission used an empirical approach to initiate
the starting point for the Guidelines. 76 The Commission "analyzed data
drawn from 10,000 presentence investigations, the differing elements of
various crimes as distinguished in substantive criminal statutes, the
United States Parole Commission's guidelines and statistics, and data
from other relevant sources in order to determine which distinctions

Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 14 CRIM. JUST. 28, 30 (1999) [hereinafter Breyer, Guidelines
Revisited]. In its third entry of four in the Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime, SITTING IN
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS, supra, the authors conducted
probing interviews of fifty-one sitting federal district judges from seven districts around the
nation, districts in which there is a relatively high proportion of white-collar cases. The purpose
of the study was to "extend current thought about sentencing and its underlying rationale."
WHEELER ET AL., supra, at 193. While the judges reached a consensus on the general factors to
consider in sentencing, including the dimensions of harm, blameworthiness, and consequence, the
weight accorded to each factor led to the variance in sentences in general. Id. at 192. These three
factors were also recognized by the authors of the study and the judges as having the greatest
import on the sentencing of all criminals, common and white-collar alike. Id. at 192-93.
Nevertheless, the study revealed the single "major exception" to the general conclusion:
[J]udges often show a special sensitivity to white-collar offenders. The white-collar
offender may remind the judge of a colleague or neighbor, while the street offender is
no more than a stranger. This may make it easier to conclude that one offender is more
deserving of probation than the other.
id. at 192. The authors went on to speculate that "[i]n a fully articulated sentencing system, this
exception would be reduced." Id. The Guidelines are a much more "fully articulated sentencing
system" than the one in place at the time the interviews were taken, those interviews having
occurred prior to the implementation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. See id. The authors
further recognized that the interviews were just the "talk" of judges, without an analysis of actual
sentencing results by each of them; what the judges said and what they actually did could be
significantly different. Id. at 161 n. 11. The fact remains that at least some of the judges were
willing to sayv
that the background of the white-collar offender made the question of imposing a
sentence of imprisonment a much more difficult decision to contemplate. Id. at 161-63.
74. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 60-61.
75. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2000) (stating that current sentences do not reflect the
serious nature of the offenses, and the Sentencing Commission must determine the average
sentences imposed in those sentences to the actual prison time served), amended by 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819
(2002). At the time the Guidelines were enacted, about half of all federal white-collar criminals
(fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering) were
sentenced to probation only. Since the Guidelines have gone into effect, the trend to imprison
such offenders has increased to just over 60%, sentences of probation have dropped to nearly
20%, and sentences of probation and other sentencing alternatives have increased from less than
5% to just under 20%. Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal
Sentence Severity: 1980-1998, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 12, 15 (1999) (stating that use of probation
under the Guidelines was dramatically cut).
76. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1,pt. A.3.
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The Sentencing
were important in pre-guidelines practice." 7 7
Commission's study of these data revealed that "white-collar crimes,"
such as fraud, were punished less severely than common law crimes,
such as theft. 78 In particular, the courts granted probation to whitecollar offenders more frequently, and prison terms were less severe for
those white-collar offenders who did not receive probation. 79 Armed
with this knowledge, the Sentencing Commission set about to target
"the most important source8 °of sentencing disparity-the decision of
whether or not to imprison.
In establishing the appropriate Guidelines range for "white-collar"
sentences, the Sentencing Commission, relying on the language of the
SRA, 8 1 determined that, for all but the least serious cases, short but
certain terms of confinement would be the norm. 82 Imprisonment at the
lower levels of the Guidelines could take the form of confinement of
twelve months or less, with the discretion of the sentencing court to
impose intermittent confinement, community confinement, or full
imprisonment. 8 3 Thus, although the potential for imprisonment for

77. Id.
78. See Breyer, Key Compromises, supra note 55, at 20 & 192 n.50 (describing the Sentencing
Commission's model of current sentencing practices). Justice Breyer worked for the Senate
Judiciary Committee when Congress considered sentencing reform and was a member of the
original Sentencing Commission from 1985 to 1989. See Breyer, Guidelines Revisited, supra
note 73, at 28 (discussing problems that the original Sentencing Commission attempted to solve
and making several recommendations to address contemporary criticisms); see also U.S.S.G. ch.
I, pts. A.3, A.4(g) (comparing pre-Guidelines sentencing practice and sentences under the
Guidelines); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 26-29 (1987); Hofer & Semisch, supra
note 75, at 13-15 (noting that the use of simple probation was dramatically cut under the
Guidelines, but the shift was mostly to intermediate sanctions and not to imprisonment).
79. See Breyer, Key Compromises, supra note 55, at 20 (noting the Sentencing Commission's
finding of significant discrepancies in pre-Guideline punishment of certain white-collar crimes
and common law crimes).
80. Michael E. Smith, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 896, 898 (1978) (reviewing PIERCE
O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977)).
81. "[I]n many cases, current sentences do not accurately reflect the seriousness of the
28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2000), amended by 21st Century Department of Justice
offense."
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819(2002).
82. U.S.S.G. ch. 1,pt. A.4(d); see also Breyer, Key Compromises, supra note 55, at 22 (noting
how pre-Guidelines judges could impose probation without any term of confinement to certain
white-collar offenders).
83. The Sentencing Table is separated into four "zones" that cut diagonally across the upper
section of the table. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table. In zone A, all of the sentencing
ranges are zero to six months. Id. In zone B, the ranges begin with at least one month, and no
range in the zone goes beyond twelve months. Id. In zone C, sentencing ranges begin at eight or
nine months, and the highest end ranges for the zone are up to fifteen to sixteen months. Id. In
zone D, the lowest sentencing ranges begin with twelve months, and the highest ranges are life
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most white-collar crimes was increased under the Sentencing
Guidelines, the length of the terms and the severity of the sentencing
options were just a small step toward proportionality, providing
expanded options to impose punishment greater than a fine and
probation, but still less than full imprisonment.
In addition to an appropriate exercise of caution in increasing the
white-collar sentencing practices under the Guidelines, the statutory
directives constrained the Sentencing Commission by requiring it to
consider the impact of its sentencing recommendation upon the prison
population. 85 Although the authorizing statute did not restrict the
Sentencing Commission from increasing penal sanctions, the limitations
86
on the resources of the penal system needed to be considered.
imprisonment. Id. Zones A, B, and C provide various sentencing options that do not require
imprisonment or at least do not require it for the entire sentencing period (except in the case of a
statutory mandatory minimum sentence). Id. § 5Cl.l(b). In zone D, imprisonment is mandated.
Id. § 5C 1.1 (f). Thus, for example:
If the applicable guideline range is in zone B of the Sentencing Table, the minimum
term may be satisfied by(1) a sentence of imprisonment; or
(2) a sentence of imprisonment that includes a term of supervised release with a
condition that substitutes community confinement or home detention according to
the schedule in subsection (e), provided that at least one month is satisfied by
imprisonment; or
(3) a sentence of probation that includes a condition or combination of
conditions that substitute intermittent confinement, community confinement, or
home detention for imprisonment according the schedule in subsection (e).
Id. § 5C1.1(c).
84. See id. §§ 5FI.1-5F1.7, Sentencing Options, which provides alternatives to straight
confinement, such as community confinement, id. § 5FI.1, home detention, id. § 5F1.2,
community service, id. § 5FI.3, order of notice to victims, id. § 5FI.4, and occupational
restrictions, id. § 5F1.5.
85. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g).
86. The Sentencing Commission initially estimated that the Guidelines (excluding legislated
mandatory minimum or career offender sentences) would lead to a projected increase in prison
population of approximately 10% over a period of ten years. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.4(g). The
Sentencing Commission has been criticized for adding in the projected increase in prison
population as a result of the concurrently legislated mandatory minimum and career offender
sentences prior to making its projections of prison population increases based upon its own
initiatives. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 64-65. With subsequent statutory
mandates for increased sentences of certain crimes and the Sentencing Commission's own
subsequent increases in various sentences, the Sentencing Commission's 1987 projection with
respect to the Guidelines' impact on prison population lost its relevance. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)
(2000 & West Supp. 2002) (requiring sentences "at or near the maximum term authorized" for
repeat violent offenders and drug offenders), amended by 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819 (2002); id. § 994(i)
(requiring "substantial term of imprisonment" for drug offenders); id. § 9940) (presuming
imprisonment for crimes of violence); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 24, at 64-65.
Statutory mandates not only increased the sentences over pre-Guidelines sentences, they also
added new "federal" crimes to the books for which Sentencing Guidelines had to be created. See,
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Desiring to increase white-collar sentences but lacking any historical
measure upon which to base such sentences, the Sentencing
Commission approached the task cautiously, looking to the general
purposes of punishment 87 to guide its way. In the end, the Sentencing
Commission was seeking "modest, incremental improvements in the
status quo" 88 as "the first step in an evolutionary process."" In 2001,
fourteen years after taking that first step, 90 the Sentencing Commission
approved, a group of amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that
substantially revised some sections of the Guidelines applicable to the
sentencing of economic crimes. 9 1 In light of the financial market
scandal of 2002, the amendments are, arguably, unlikely to vindicate the
Act of 2002 because
underlying policy purposes of the Sarbanes-Oxley
92
of the danger of excessive departures.
e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & West. Supp. 2002);
Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2000); Anti-Car Theft Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2119 (2000); Violence Against Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000); see generally Sara Sum
Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Court, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. ScI. 39, 43 (1996) (reviewing the recent federalization of crimes).
87. "The Commission concluded that the definite prospect of prison, even though the term
may be short, will serve as a significant deterrent, particularly when compared with preguidelines practice where probation, not prison, was the norm." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.4(d).
88. Id. ch. 1, pt. A.3.
89. Id. Even under the Sentencing Guidelines, white-collar criminal sentences were criticized
as "often too short in relation to their moral seriousness, in relation to the harm they cause, and in
relation to the investment of resources required to prosecute them." Bowman, Quality of Mercy,
supra note 43, at 740.
90. This is not to say that there have been no adjustments to the white-collar sentencing
scheme since the formulation of the original Guidelines. For example, the Antitrust Offenses at
U.S.S.G. § 2RI.1 were amended November 1, 1989, U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 211, 303, and
effective November 1, 1991, U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 377, 422. The Fraud Guidelines, U.S.S.G.
§ 2F1.I, were previously amended in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998, and
2000. U.S.S.G. app. C, amends. 30, 154-56, 303, 317, 364, 393, 470, 481, 482, 513, 551, 577,
587, 595, 596, 597.
91. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and various provisions scattered throughout; Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,527-46 (June 6, 2001). As this Article went to
press, the Sentencing Commission issued temporary guidelines, promulgated under the
emergency amendment authority granted by Congress, implementing provisions under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The temporary guidelines affect several sections of the United
Sates Sentencing Guidelines, in particular sections 2B1.1, 2T4.1, and 3D1.2. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: INCREASED PENALTIES UNDER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT
OF 2002, at i (2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/S-Oreport.pdf (last modified
Jan. 2003) [hereinafter USSC REPORT TO CONGRESS]. The temporary amendment expires on
November 1, 2003, when a permanent amendment becomes effective. Id.
92. The Economic Crime Package is a strong and well-considered amendment.
Unfortunately, as a result of vacant positions on the Sentencing Commission, the amendment
process took six years. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 33-36. The deterrent benefit
of the amendments is too late to avert the current financial scandals; as noted and discussed in
Part IV.B. 1, infra, however, the retributive purpose of the amendments should apply to many of
the accounting scandals. U.S.S.G. § IBI. II (use of Guidelines manual that is in effect on the
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II.
A.

ECONOMIC CRIME REFORM

The 2001 Economic Crime Package: Consolidation,
Clarification,and Certainty

The 2001 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, collectively
referred to as the "Economic Crime Package," 93 consist of six major
parts:
(1) [c]onsolidation of the theft, property destruction, and fraud
guidelines; (2) a revised, common loss table for the consolidated
guideline, and a similar table for tax offenses; (3) a revised, common
definition of loss for the consolidated guideline; (4) revisions to
guidelines that refer to the loss table in the consolidated guideline; (5)
technical94and conforming amendments; and (6) amendments regarding
tax loss.

One key factor driving the amendments was the recognition that, where
"pecuniary harm is the major factor in determining offense level, ' 95 two
sections of the Guidelines were at issue.

Section 2B1.1, 96 entitled

"Theft, Embezzlement, Receipt of Stolen Property, and Property
Destruction," and section 2F1.1, 97 entitled "Fraud and Deceit; Forgery;
Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than
Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States," contained
substantial overlap in the types of criminal conduct that could fall under

date of sentencing); supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the effective date of the
Guidelines). If the prescribed Guidelines sentences are imposed, punishment based on the
changes in the Guidelines should deter future white-collar criminals. Perhaps because work on
the amendment began before Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), was decided or the
effects of that decision became apparent, the issue of downward departures was not considered in
developing the Economic Crime Package. See infra notes 185-216 and accompanying text
(discussing Koon and downward departures following the decision). Ironically, the higher terms
of imprisonment, while purposefully based, will likely lead to greater pressure to depart
downward. This Article proposes addressing the extent of departures directly, in order to effect
the purpose of the Economic Crime Package of 2001 and the recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
93. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,510, 30,540 (June 6,
2001).
94. Id. For an inside review and analysis of the Economic Crime Package amendments, see
generally Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 32-85 (reviewing the history behind the
2001 sentencing reform initiative, summarizing the most pertinent provisions of the reforms, and
highlighting the most contentious areas of the reform while addressing the rationale underlying
their resolutions).
95. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. at 30,512, 30,540 (June 6,
2001).
96. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.
97. Id. § 2F1l.
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either section for the purposes of sentencing. 9 8 Disparate sentencing
outcomes may result, however, depending upon the loss tables
contained within each section. 99 The competing sections also suffered
from the same frailties in that courts struggled with defining "loss" for
purposes of applying the loss tables in each section. 10 0 The calculation
of loss under both sections of the Guidelines, as well as other sections
that referred back to the loss tables of sections 2B 1.1 and 2F1.1, became
"one of the most commonly litigated issues in federal sentencing
law."' 10 1 Splits in the circuit courts had developed concerning factors to
consider in calculating losses, such as whether interest should
be
1 3
1 2 and whether "net" versus "gross" loss controlled. 0
0
included
The consolidation of the loss tables of sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1 into
the revised section 2B1.1 ("Fraud and Theft Guideline") reflects a
principle feature of the Economic Crime Package. At the low end of the
loss table, offenders should receive lower base-level offense
assignments, intended by the Sentencing Commission to permit the
courts greater flexibility in sentencing to more ably meet purposes of
punishment and the goal of facilitating restitution payments."° 4 The
98. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. at 30,512, 30,540 (June 6,
2001).
99. id.
100. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 26-27 (citing MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON &
SCOTT A. GILBERT, THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, RESULTS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER'S 1996 SURVEY (1997) (reporting that a 1996 survey of the attitudes of federal judges
and probation officers revealed that those surveyed found the fraud guideline lacking in clarity));
see also Diane E. Murphy, Inside the United States Sentencing Commission: Federal Sentencing
Policy in 2001 and Beyond, 87 IOWA L. REV. 359, 364-66 & nn.28-29 (2002) (providing an
insider's view of the factors impacting the Commission's decisions regarding the 2001
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, including the resolution of circuit conflicts in the
calculation of loss under the combined theft and fraud guideline).
101. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 25 ("loss" in the original Guidelines could
increase offense levels dramatically depending on the amount of "loss" found by the court); see
also U.S.S.G. 2001 supp. to app. C, amend. 617, at 185-90 (identifying conflicts between circuits
and citing to conflicting cases concerning a variety of "loss" issues, including intended versus
actual loss, causation and forseeability of loss, "consequential damages," interest on loss, how to
credit payments made to victims as against loss, use of gain when no loss can be determined, and
treatment of diversion of government program benefits).
102. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 56-57 (noting that the Sentencing
Commission excluded interest because it did little to make loss more accurately reflect the level
of the offense).
103. Id. at 57-61 (discussing the problem of accounting for net or gross loss of money or
property transfer, that is, whether to credii the defendant for repayments prior to detection but
after "completion" of the offense).
104. See, e.g., Barry Boss, Do We Need to Increase the Sentences in White-Collar Cases? A
View from the Trenches, 10 FED. SENT. REP. 124, 125 (1997) (asserting that increasing sentences
for economic crime offenders, such as those who forge endorsements on low-dollar United States
Treasury checks, is an unwarranted reaction to long imprisonment terms for drug offenders).
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most significant change in the Fraud and Theft Guideline, however, is
the intent that the new loss table will engender "substantial increases in
penalties" for those offenders whose criminal conduct resulted in
"moderate and higher loss amounts.'' 10 5 The Sentencing Commission's
purpose in effectuating this change was to respond to criticism that "the
offenses sentenced under the guidelines consolidated by this
amendment under-punish individuals involved with moderate and high
loss amounts, relative to penalty levels for offenses of similar
seriousness sentenced under other guidelines." 10 6 Similar changes
reflecting the concern of under-punishment were also affected in the
revised loss table for tax offenses resulting in "significantly higher
10 7
penalty levels" for offenses causing moderate and high tax losses.
Professor Bowman characterizes the Economic Crime Package as a
"milestone in the history of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," not
only because he estimates that economic crimes comprise between onefifth and one-quarter of all federal sentencings, but also because the
package represents the first time in the "history of the guidelines that
the Sentencing Commission has thoroughly rewritten the guidelines
governing a major crime category." 10 8 From the outset, the Guidelines
were intended to be evolutionary and thus revised over time based upon
"research, experience and analysis."' 1 9 Having arrived at the point of a
"thorough" rewriting, will the Guidelines influence sentencing decisions
and the deterrence of economic crimes? Or will the discretionary

105. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,542 (June 6,
2001). The temporary amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2BI.l further adds two additional loss levels
above the previous high end of losses more than $100,000,000. The amendment increases the
specific offense characteristics level to twenty-eight (from twenty-six) for losses of more
than $200,000,000 and to thirty for losses of more than $400,000,000.
U.S.S.G. ch. 1,
§ 2B 1.l(b)(l)(O)-(P) (Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2002supp/2bl I .htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
106. Id. Additionally, the "more than minimal planning" was eliminated as a separate specific
offense characteristic and merged into the base level for the offense because it was found to be
present in 80% of the fraud cases prior to the Guidelines' change. See Bowman, 2001 Reforms,
supra note 51, at 30; U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.l(b)(4)(A), 2F1.l(b)(2)(A) (2002).
107. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,542 (June 6,
2001); U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1. To maintain parity with the Fraud and Theft Guidelines levels in
section 2B 1.1, the temporary amendment to the Guidelines also added two additional levels to the
top end of the loss table for tax offenses. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, § 2T4.1 (Supp. 2002) (effective Jan. 25,
2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002supp/2t4-l.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003); see also
supra note 105 (discussing the additional levels created by the temporary amendment to the
Guidelines).
108. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 8.
109. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.2 (2002).
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10
application of the Guidelines by prosecutors, in selectively charging
and negotiating pleas, and by judges,"' in handing down sentencing
decisions on matters like departures and enhancements, hinder the

newly adopted Economic Crime Package in influencing future criminal
behavior?
The Economic Crime Package illustrates the Sentencing
Commission's continued willingness to move sentencing of high-dollar
economic criminal offenses toward more severe terms of imprisonment.
The Sentencing Commission sought feedback on the proposed
Guidelines amendments from federal judges, prosecutors, and the
criminal defense bar so that the amendments to the Guidelines would
encompass the collective experience of those who use the Guidelines.
Notably, the amendments were urged not only by prosecutors at the
Department of Justice, but also by the Criminal Law Committee of the
Judicial Conference. 112 The significance of such support cannot be
ignored. Fourteen years ago, historical sentencing patterns revealed
1 13
probation to be the norm in the sentencing of white-collar criminals.
Judicial attitudes toward the sentencing of economic offenders were
lax. 1 14 Lessons learned by all concerning the need for participation and
110. See infra Part II.B (discussing the use of money laundering charges in large-scale fraud
cases); see also Bowman & Heise, supra note 48, at 1119-22 (describing the creative charging
decisions of prosecutors to avoid the mandatory minimum sentences imposed by Congress in
narcotics cases); infra notes 305-18 and accompanying text (describing the defendant's ability to
provide reasons to reduce sentencing to a lower offense level).
11. See infra Part III (addressing the role of departures in sentencing).
112. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,542 (June 6,
2001).
113. See supra Part I.C (discussing the history of lenient treatment of white-collar criminals as
compared to common law criminals).
114. Unlike the many street crime offenders standing before the court, economic crime
offenders did not appear to have the characteristics that warranted terms of imprisonment; they
were not physical dangers to others, and they were stable members of their communities with
families, homes, and jobs. Probation was the primary term to which these offenders were
sentenced, supported by the rationalization that they had been sufficiently punished by the shame
of the process and the label of convicted criminal. John B. Owens, Have We No Shame?:
Thoughts on Shaming, "White Collar" Criminals, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 49
AM. U. L. REV. 1047, 1056-57 (2000). "The criminal process is an inherently public and
humiliating experience." Id. at 1053. Owens' essay describes the numerous opportunities for an
economic crime offender to be shamed, beginning with a visit to his home or business by law
enforcement armed with a search warrant and continuing through to sentencing, and highlights
the options for sentencing in Chapter 5 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1053-55. Courts
have concluded that community service and restitution are the better ways to remedy the wrongs
committed. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing historical sentencing patterns).
In contrast, the Judicial Conference Committee was behind the move toward greater severity in
imprisonment terms for economic crimes under the 2001 Economic Crime Package. See supra
note 112 (discussing feedback that the Sentencing Commission received on proposed harsher
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines).
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the opportunity to tap the experience and expertise of the judges most
likely contributed to the change in Sentencing Commission perspective
11 5
on the value of the Judicial Conference's recommendations.
Additionally, fourteen years of turnover on the bench, increased
publicity regarding the financial costs of economic crime to the
economy, and conditioning from years of sentencing economic
criminals to terms of imprisonment made such changes more
acceptable.
The Economic Crime Package is propitious given the recent
accounting scandals in the financial markets that virtually coincided
with the November 2001 effective date of the amendments. 116 The
losses to shareholder equity and the gains to some high-level executives,
if proven to be unlawful, support the longer terms of imprisonment for
moderate and high-dollar losses in the Economic Crime Package.
Nevertheless, terms of imprisonment imposed after the implementation
of the Economic Crime Package may not result in longer prison terms
than those previously imposed for some economic crime offenders also
charged with money laundering offenses. Concurrent with the passage
of the Economic Crime Package, changes were made to the Money
Laundering Guidelines 117 that could eliminate any "gains" to lengthy
imprisonment terms for economic crime offenders. 8 Additionally, the
frequency of downward departures under the Guidelines continues to
increase so that many sentences
are being imposed outside the
119
applicable Guidelines ranges.

115. Proposals to place the initial draft of the Sentencing Guidelines with the Judicial
Conference were rejected, and legislators appeared to ignore the potential contribution that would
be made if those charged with actually sentencing convicted criminals took part in creating the
scheme that would, ultimately, direct and affect their discretion. See Stith & Koh, supra note 30,
at 275-79 (noting that the Senate believed that judges contributed to the problem and did not
deserve to play a role in creating the solution). But see infra note 286 and accompanying text
(suggesting that although the judges on the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference
may support the amendments, the actual sentencing practice of their brethren is not necessarily
reflective of the committee's view).
116. Although the activities of Enron may not fall within the scope of the new amendments
because they were discovered and ended prior to the effective date of the Guidelines amendments,
many companies "fell" after the effective date, which should subject their executives to the new
Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 1BI. 11.
117. Id. § 2S1.1.
118. See infra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (discussing how the 2001 amendments to
the Money Laundering Guidelines effectively eliminated the use of money laundering charges to
lengthen terms of imprisonment for high-loss economic crimes).
119. See infra Part III (discussing the role of departures in sentencing).
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B. The Money Laundering Guidelines Amendment:
Clarity Replaces Disparity
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986120 ("MLCA") imposes
criminal liability for monetary transactions conducted with funds
Although the Act was
knowingly derived from illegal activity.
prosecutors seized upon
originally intended as anti-drug legislation,
the broad language 122 of the MLCA to enhance imprisonment terms 1of
23
economic crime offenders by charging them with money laundering,
which carried stiffer penalty ranges, 124 as well as with forfeiture
provisions, 125 particularly when the resulting Fraud and Theft Guideline

120. Money Laundering Control Act ("MLCA") of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000 &
West Supp. 2002), amended by 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 4002, 4005, 116 Stat. 1758, 1807-13 (2002).
121. See G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the '90's, 27 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 149, 206-07 (1989) (surveying the doctrinal development of money laundering legislation).
122. The MLCA, under § 1957, bars all monetary transactions exceeding $10,000 in
"criminally derived property." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), added more crimes to the list of "specified unlawful
activity." The financial transactions covered under the MLCA have been construed to include
many crimes unrelated to drugs or gangs. See United States v. Deeb, 175 F.3d 1163, 1167-68
(9th Cir. 1999) (involving the sales of securities); United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 92 (5th
Cir. 1994) (submitting a false claim to an insurer); United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206,
1210-11 (10th Cir. 1991) (involving the conversion of cattle, when such cattle was used to secure
a federal Farmers Home Administration ("FMHA") loan); see also Kirk McCormick & Brian
Stekloff, Money Laundering, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 729, 743-45 (2000) (discussing financial
transactions by surveying the meaning of "financial transaction" as used in the MLCA Act).
By 1997, the Sentencing Commission had become increasingly concerned with the broadening
of the application of the Money Laundering Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SENTENCING POLICY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING OFFENSES, INCLUDING COMMENTS ON
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT 5 (1997), available at http://www.ussc.govlr-congressl
LAUNDER.PDF [hereinafter MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT].
123. See Elkan Abramowitz, Money Laundering: The New RICO?, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 1, 1992, at
3, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Law Journal File (recognizing the upward
trend in charges of money laundering in connection with white-collar crimes and away from
RICO prosecutions).
124. MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT, supra note 122, at 7-9 (considering sentencing
disparities for white-collar criminals when charges are brought under the MLCA). Penalties
under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 include imprisonment terms of up to twenty years; those under § 1957
include imprisonment terms of up to ten years. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (West Supp. 2002).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2000 & West Supp. 2002) (providing that the court shall order
forfeiture to the United States of any real or personal property involved in or traceable to the
offense when imposing a sentence based upon a conviction under section 1956 or section 1957),
amended by International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 372(b)(2), 115 Stat. 272, 339; see also Abramowitz, supra note 123,
at 3 (reviewing the use of forfeiture in non-drug or organized crime related convictions under the
MLCA).
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did not support a length of imprisonment reflective of the criminal
conduct.12
12 7
The 2001 amendment to the Money Laundering Guidelines
consolidated two previous guidelines, section 2S1.1, entitled
"Laundering of Monetary Instruments," and section 2S1.2, entitled
"Engaging in Money Transactions in Property Derived from Specified
Unlawful Activity," both of which applied to convictions under the
MLCA. 128 The money laundering amendment is not part' of the
Economic Crime Package but is closely tied to its purpose in that the
amendment promotes proportionality in sentencing so that those cases
perceived to be more serious or egregious, such as drug trafficking,
crimes of violence, and fraud offenses generating relatively high-loss
amounts, yield longer terms of imprisonment than basic fraud offenses
generating relatively low-loss amounts. 129 To that end, the amendment
directs determination of the base-level offense calculation back to the
130
underlying conduct of the offense that generated the laundered funds.
Also significant, at least with respect to white-collar crimes, the
amendment resolves a split in the circuits regarding the grouping of
closely related counts under the Guidelines. 13 1 Under the amendment,
the Sentencing Commission requires that a defendant convicted of a
money laundering offense and an underlying offense that generated the
funds group those counts together.132

126. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, MONEY LAUNDERING WORKING GROUP REPORT,
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2 (1995) (reporting that the addition of a money laundering
charge increased the offense level 94.5% of the time in fraud cases), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/moneylau/monilaun.htm (last modified Feb. 28, 1995).
127. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 634, at 218-25 (2001).
128. MLCA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000 & West Supp. 2002), amended by 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 4002, 4005,
116 Stat. 1758, 1807-13 (2002). The Sentencing Commission previously proposed changes to
the Money Laundering Guidelines, which were affirmatively rejected by Congress. See Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat.
334; see also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2000 & West. Supp. 2002) (historical and statutory notes),
amended by 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§ 11008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819 (2002); H.R. REP. No. 104-272, at 14-15 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 335, 348-49.
129. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 634, at 222.
130. Id. § 2S1.l(a)(1). Often such conduct is the subject of other criminal charges.
131. Id. app. C, amend. 634, at 224. The Sentencing Commission compared the Third, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits, whose courts found that fraud convictions should be grouped with money
laundering convictions, and the First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, whose courts
refused to deem such crimes "closely related" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
132. Id. § 2S1.1, cmt. n.6, Grouping of Multiple Counts (directing application of § 3D1.2(c),
Groups of Closely-Related Counts).
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When counts of conviction are grouped together for Guidelines
calculations, the resulting sentencing range will usually be less than if
counts were not grouped. Closely related counts are grouped "[i]n order
to limit the significance of the formal charging decision and to prevent
' 133
multiple punishment for substantially identical offense conduct."
When there is more than one group, the additional groups will either
increase the offense level (and, therefore, the sentencing range) or have
no effect on the offense level. By requiring that the money laundering
counts and any charges for which the underlying conduct is the source
of the laundered funds be grouped together as closely related counts, the
Guidelines eliminate the possibility of additional groups that could
increase the sentencing offense level. The amendment effectively
133. Id. ch. 3, pt. D, Multiple Counts. When convicted of multiple counts, the most serious
offense is used as the starting point in calculating the sentencing range. Id. If the counts are not
grouped together as "closely-related counts," then they are grouped separately, and the starting
point is the group with the most serious offense level. Id. The other groups are assigned "units"
based on the relative seriousness of those offenses compared to the initial group. Section 3DI.4
provides:
The combined offense level is determined by taking the offense level applicable to the
Group with the highest offense level and increasing that offense level by the amount
indicated in the following table:
Number of Units
Increase in Offense Level
I
none
1 1/2
add 1 level
2
add 2 levels
22-3
add 3 levels
3 2-5
add 4 levels
More than 5
add 5 levels
In determining the number of Units for purposes of this section:
(1) Count as one Unit the Group with the highest offense level. Count one additional
Unit for each Group that is equally serious or from I to 4 levels less serious.
(2) Count as one-half Unit any Group that is 5 to 8 levels less serious than the Group
with the highest offense level.
(3) Disregard any Group that is 9 or more levels less serious than the Group with the
highest offense level. Such Groups will not increase the applicable offense level
but may provide a reason for sentencing at the higher end of the sentencing range
for the applicable offense level.
Id. § 3D1.4.
In combination, the "units" may add as many as five additional levels or no additional levels to
the offense level calculation for sentencing purposes. Groups that have an offense level that is 9
or more levels less serious than the initial group are completely disregarded, except to guide
discretion for sentencing within the range. The grouping of offenses blunts the discretion of
individual prosecutors. For example, each mailing in a mail fraud scheme may support a separate
charge of mail fraud. In a scheme with ten mailings, one prosecutor might file a single charge
based on all ten mailings, whereas another prosecutor might seek ten charges of mail fraud. Upon
conviction under either charging scheme, the sentence calculation under the Guidelines would
yield the same sentence as a result of grouping closely related counts. See id. ch. 3, pt. D,
Multiple Counts.
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removes the money laundering charge as a source of longer
imprisonment terms in high-loss economic crimes, although the
forfeiture34 provision is a continued incentive for including such a
charge. 1
The frequent use of departures threatens the overall success of the
Sentencing Guidelines by undermining the goal of uniformity. The
Sentencing Commission identified downward departure rates for nondrug money laundering offenses from 1992 to 1997 as 32% higher than
for all other crimes.13 5 Sentencing ranges outside the "heartland" 136 of
the underlying offenses as a result of the inability to group money
laundering charges with the underlying offenses have been identified as
one of the reasons courts in white-collar cases tended to depart from
guideline sentencing ranges. 137 Now that sentencing under the Money
Laundering Guidelines will be based upon the underlying offense and
grouped with such offenses, the applicable sentencing range cannot be
viewed as outside the heartland of the offense, and the impetus to depart
downward should be alleviated. Nevertheless, not only are departures
in non-drug money laundering cases high, but the rate of non-substantial
assistance departures in fraud offenses has been rising over the last
38
several years. 1

134. Given reported levels of financial gain by some corporate executives and directors in the
recent scandals, forfeiture may be desirable. See infra notes 223-25, 243-44, 277 and
accompanying text (discussing the fact that many victims will remain uncompensated in large
corporate cases).
135. See MONEY LAUNDERING REPORT, supra note 122, at 9.
136. The Guidelines describe the "heartland" as "a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes." U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.4(b), at 6. Atypical cases, which appear by
the language of a guideline to fall within its parameters but "where conduct differs significantly
from the norm," may be considered to fall outside the heartland and, therefore, be subject to
departure considerations. Id.; see also Frank 0. Bowman III, Places in the Heartland:Departure
JurisprudenceAfter Koon, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 19, 19-22 (1996) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
decision favoring increased district court departure authority) [hereinafter Bowman, Places in the
Heartland].
137. Jonathan H. Hecht, Airing the Dirty Laundry: The Application of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines to White Collar Money Laundering Offenses, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 289,
319-21 (1999) (examining judicial dissatisfaction with Money Laundering Guidelines in
connection with white-collar crimes).
138. See infra notes 183, 201-02, 206-07, 209 (citing to statistics on downward departures).
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C. Enhancing White- Collar Crime Penaltiesand Accountabilityfor
CorporateFraud
On July 30, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.139 The legislation, intended to address
corporate irresponsibility and to inhibit and punish corporate fraud,
sailed through to passage on a wave of public outrage and a plunge in
the stock market, which convinced politicians that political action was
necessary to shore up confidence
in the American economy before the
0
election season in September.14
Title IX of the Act concerns penalty enhancements and increases the
maximum terms of imprisonment for some white-collar crimes, creates
criminal penalties for knowingly or willfully fraudulent certified
financial reports, and directs the Sentencing Commission to review and
amend the Guidelines within 180 days to "reflect the serious nature of
the offenses and penalties set forth in this Act." 14 1 Title XI of the Act,
directed specifically at corporate fraud, addresses obstruction of justice,
protection of whistle-blowers, increased criminal penalties under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission's ("SEC") authority to freeze assets and bar persons from
serving as officers or directors. 142 It also directs the Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the Guidelines to reflect the
legislation. 14 3 With concerns that the rush to implement the legislation

139. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Title IX of the Act
covers penalty enhancements, id. §§ 901-906 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341), and Title XI
addresses corporate fraud accountability, id. §§ 1101-1107 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78).
140. See Hilzenrath et al., supra note 45 (describing the events that shaped the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, which, as proposed by Sarbanes, was given little chance of success until
WorldCom's troubles crushed remaining opposition by illuminating the need for political
expediency); Alison Mitchell, G.O.P. Lawmakers Bolt Bush's Herd, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2002,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File; Gerald F. Seib & John
Harwood, Rising Anxiety: What Could Bring 1930s-Style Reform of U.S. Businesses?, WALL ST.
J., July 24, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3401584 (reporting on public opinion polls
showing that Americans want the President and Congress to focus on prosecuting corporate
wrongdoers).
141. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 902-904, 116 Stat. 745, 805 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341) (enhancing penalties); id. § 905 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994
note) (directive to Sentencing Commission); id. § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (certification of
financial reports).
142. Id. § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a note) (obstruction of
justice); id. § 1103 (asset freezing authority); id. § 1105, 116 Stat. 745, 809 (to be codified at 28
U.S.C. § 994 note) (authority to bar individuals from serving as directors and officers); id. §
1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (increased criminal penalties); id. § 1107 (protection of whistleblowers).
143. Id. § 1104, 116 Stat. 745, 808 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note) (directive to
Sentencing Commission).
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was politically motivated, 14 4 one must ask first, whether the enhanced
penalties will deter future criminal conduct, and second, whether the
directive to the Sentencing Commission should result in technical
changes or in substantive changes to the recently reformed Fraud and
Theft Guideline.
1. Enhanced Penalties
Under the Guidelines, a sentence may not exceed the maximum
sentence for that statute; thus, the upper end of any sentencing range for
an offense is capped by any limit set forth within the statute under
which the defendant is convicted. 145 For example, prior to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 146 the maximum term of imprisonment for a single
conviction of mail fraud was five years, 14 7 and any sentencing range for
a mail fraud conviction that provided for a term of imprisonment
beyond sixty months was disregarded beyond the sixtieth month.
Additionally, while multiple counts of mail fraud are grouped together
under the Guidelines, the statutory maximum is available for each
count. In practice, any complex fraud scheme would easily support
more than one count of fraud. 14 8 Thus, if the level of loss would
support a Guidelines range of over sixty months, more than one count of
mail fraud usually could be charged so that the statutory maximum was
not a barrier to sentencing. Notably then, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, which quadrupled the statutory maximum penalty for mail and
wire fraud in light of the accounting scandals, is largely an empty
measure with no probable change to the actual sentences. Likewise, as
will be discussed in Part III, the enhancement is ineffectual if the

144. See supra note 140 (discussing the political storm behind the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); supra
note 45 (discussing Judge Frankel's concern with criminal penalties created in a politicallycharged environment).
145. U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(a).
146. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 805
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 1341(a)-(b)) (increasing the maximum penalty for a single count of mail
fraud or wire fraud from a five-year to a twenty-year term of imprisonment); see also 18 U.S.C. §
1341 (2000) (mail fraud statute), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
116 Stat. 745; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000) (wire fraud statute), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903(b), 116 Stat. 745, 805.
147. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (mail fraud statute), amended by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903(a), 116 Stat. 745, 805.
148. For example, any United States postal mailing made in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud could be charged as a separate count; under the previous mail fraud statute, if ten
mailings were made in furtherance of the scheme to defraud, then ten charges of mail fraud could
be brought, with a total statutory maximum sentence of fifty years imprisonment if sentences
were imposed consecutively, albeit limited by the calculated Guidelines range. Id.
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court sentences at the low end of the range, or departs
sentencing 49
altogether.'
2. Review of the Sentencing Guidelines
The directive to the Sentencing Commission to review the Guidelines
to ensure that they reflect the nature of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not
mandate that the recently imposed Economic Crime Package, effective
November 1, 2001, be substantively altered. By the expiration of the
180-day limit in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 the Economic Crime
Package reforms will have been in effect for fourteen months. The ex
post facto limitation on the Guidelines requires that they apply only to
conduct that occurred after the effective date of the amendment, when
the resulting sentence will be higher than it was prior to the
amendment. 15 ' Because of the time it takes to investigate, prosecute,
and sentence white-collar crime, few white-collar crime cases will have
been sentenced under the amendment within the first year it is in
effect. 152 As discussed in Part II.A, in constructing the Economic
Crime Package, the Sentencing Commission labored for six years and
incorporated the expertise of federal prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
the federal judiciary to reflect their experience with white-collar crime
and the Sentencing Guidelines and to impose higher penalties believed
to appropriately reflect the purposes of punishment as required by the
SRA. 153 It would seem ludicrous, after this careful process, to hastily
create further punishment enhancements without first determining

149. See infra note 215 (discussing the low end of range); see also infra notes 183, 201-02,
206-07, 209 (citing to departure statistics).
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204. §§ 905(c), 1104(c), 116 Stat. 745,
806, 809.
151. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 432-33 (1987); U.S.S.G. § IBl.ll(b)(2) (requiring
that the "Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular date shall be applied in its entirety").
152. In adopting the temporary guidelines amendments, the Sentencing Commission
recognized the difficulty in enhancing penalties in light of the recent 2001 amendments:
The difficulty of assessing the impact and desirability of changes to the loss table is
further compounded by the fact that the same amendment that consolidated the theft,
property destruction, and fraud guidelines also made significant changes to the loss
table effective November 1, 2001, and the Commission currently does not have
available sentencing data reflecting the impact of those changes ....
Because of ex post facto concerns and the significant lag time between the
commission of these types of offenses and the sentencing of such offenders, the
Commission has just begun to receive court documents for defendants sentenced under
the loss table effective November 1, 2001, and cannot yet determine the impact of the
effectiveness of these changes.
USSC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 91, at 7.
153. See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of the Economic Crime Package).
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whether the current fix is sufficient. 154 While it may appear over time
that the Economic Crime Package does not go far enough, the
Sentencing Commission is isolated from public pressure to randomly
increase terms of imprisonment. 15 5 Rather than enhance penalties, the
better course to effect current reforms is to shut the backdoor to the
Sentencing Guidelines, that is, to address downward departures.

1II.

DEPARTURES

A. The Concession to Discretion
The complexity of the Guidelines reflects the Sentencing
Commission's attempt to obtain uniformity among sentences for similar
crimes. Thus, among the specific offense characteristics, adjustments,
and mitigating factors, the expectation was that many individually
154. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifically directs the Sentencing Commission to
consider fraud cases when there are fifty or more victims. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 1104(b)(5), 116 Stat. 745, 809 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 note). The
current applicable guideline under the Economic Crime Package already provides for a four-level
upward adjustment when the "offense involved 50 or more victims." U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1 (b)(2)(B).
The four-level adjustment became effective November 1, 2001, nine months prior to passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The temporary amendments to the Guidelines address victim impact by
providing a six-level enhancement for offenses involving 250 or more victims, increasing the
penalty by 25% over the 2001 amendments. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, § 2Bl.l(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 2002)
(effective Jan. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002supp/2bl-I.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2003); USSC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 91, at i. Proposed amendments or
modifications to the Sentencing Guidelines are submitted to Congress by May I of each year and
become effective by November I of that same year, generally, unless Congress disapproves of
such amendments or modifications. 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (2000), amended by 21st Century
Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § I1008(e), 116 Stat. 1758, 1819
(2002).
Congress has exercised its power to disapprove amendments, including a prior
submission of a modification to the Money Laundering Guidelines. See supra note 115
(discussing the judicial conference's recommendations). Additionally, the upward departure
considerations presently within the theft and fraud application notes include endangering "the
solvency or financial security of one or more victims" and causing or risking "substantial nonmonetary harm." U.S.S.G. § 2B 1. 1, cmt. n.1 5(A)(v) & (u) (2002). The temporary amendments
to the Guidelines adds to this provision as well, with a four-level enhancement and a minimum
offense level of twenty-four for "offenses that endanger the solvency or financial security of (I) a
publicly traded corporation, (2) an organization that employs 1,000 or more employees, or (3)
100 or more individual victims," increasing the punishment by 50% over the 2001 amendments.
USSC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 91, at i.; U.S.S.G. ch. 1, § 2B1. l(b)(12(B) (Supp. 2002)
(effective Jan. 25, 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2002supp/2bl-l.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2003).
155. The Sentencing Commission has been criticized as being "perhaps the least politically
accountable of all administrative agencies." Joseph W. Luby, Reining in the "Junior Varsity
Congress": A Call for Meaningful Judicial Review of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1199, 1224-55 (1999) (discussing the lack of a provision for judicial review of
Nonetheless, the Sentencing Guidelines were held to be
the Sentencing Guidelines).
constitutional after the Supreme Court considered a challenge on the basis of the delegation of
Congressional authority. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989).
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encountered factors would be anticipated in the sentencing equation.156
The sentencing table provides a range of months from which the judge
is expected to exercise discretion in selecting the appropriate term of
imprisonment or alternative to imprisonment, if the range permits that
option. 157 Ordinarily, the sentencing court must impose a sentence
within the sentencing range. Congress recognized, however, that not
every case will fit neatly into the Guidelines' regimen.158
Consequently, the sentencing court retains some discretion through the
Guidelines' backdoor, also known as "departures."
Departure from a recommended guideline range takes one of three
forms: (1) an upward departure, 159 whereby the sentencing judge may
determine that the recommended range of sentencing does not
adequately take into consideration the level of harm and the sentence
should be higher than the prescribed sentencing range; (2) a downward
departure for substantial assistance, 160 whereby the prosecutor
recommends 16 1 to the sentencing judge a lower sentence than the
prescribed sentencing range based on substantial assistance by the
defendant to the prosecution in the investigation or prosecution of
criminal activity; or (3) a downward departure, 162 whereby the
sentencing judge may determine that the sentencing range overstates the
level of harm or seriousness of the offense and that a lower sentence is

156. "[T]he guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors that the
Commission's data indicate made a significant difference in pre-guidelines sentencing practice."
U.S.S.G. ch. I pt. A.4(b) (2002).
157. See supra notes 55-62, 83-84 and accompanying text (describing sentencing calculation
under the Guidelines).
158. "The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the
thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences." S. REP. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3234-37; see also United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir.
1990) ("The legislative history reflects that it was not Congress' aim to straightjacket a
sentencing court, compelling it to impose sentences like a robot inside a Guidelines' glass bubble,
and preventing it from exercising discretion, flexibility or independent judgment.").
159. U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, 5K2.1-5K2.9, 5K2.14, 5K2.17, 5K2.18, 5K2.21.
160. Id. §5K1.I.
161. Only the prosecution in its discretion and only for a downward departure reducing the
sentence may bring a motion under U.S.S.G. §5KI.l for a departure from the Guidelines'
sentencing range. Once such a motion is made, a district court is given broad discretion in the
decision to grant or deny the motion, and such decision is, essentially, unreviewable. See, e.g.,
United States v. Busekros, 264 F.3d 1158, 1159 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Laney, 189
F.3d 954, 963 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d 1217, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Newman, 148 F.3d 871, 875 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Khalil, 132 F.3d
897, 898 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Nesbitt, 90 F.3d 164, 166 (6th Cir. 1996).
162. U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, 5K2.10-5K2.13, 5K2.16,5K2.20.
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Departure cases are
warranted under the circumstances of the case.
16 3
intended to be the extraordinary circumstance.
Setting aside for the moment departures based on substantial
assistance, the Sentencing Commission did not leave the backdoor open
as widely as it may first appear. The Sentencing Commission identified
certain factors that the judge should never take into account in
determining whether to depart from the Guidelines, including race,
gender, national origin, creed, religion, socio-economic status, 164 and
lack of guidance as a youth or disadvantaged upbringing. 165 The
Guidelines also specify characteristics and attributes that are deemed
"not ordinarily relevant" in determining whether a sentence should be
awarded outside of the applicable sentencing range. 166 Those factors
include: age; 16 7 education and vocational skills; 16 8 mental and
emotional conditions; 169 physical condition, including substance abuse
or dependency;170 employment record; 17 1 family ties and
responsibilities; 17 2 community ties; 173 and military, civic, charitable, or
public service. 174 Courts have determined, largely on a case-by-case
basis, whether one of these considerations is an extraordinary
circumstance and, while "not ordinarily relevant," applicable to warrant
a departure in a particular case. Consequently, resulting sentencing
decisions have been disparate; courts have arrived at different and
potentially inconsistent conclusions regarding consideration of, for
example, the charitable works of defendants, 175 family ties, 17678 and
177
in granting or denying departures.1
employment responsibilities
163. The Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 notes that "the Commission believes that such
cases will be extremely rare." Id. § 5K2.0, cmt.
164. Id. § 5HI.10.
165. Id. § 5H1.12.
166. The sentencing court may consider these factors, however, for determining the
appropriate sentence within the sentencing range. Id. ch. 5, pt. H.
167. Id. § 5HIl..
168. Id. § 5H1.2.
169. Id. § 5H1.3.
170. Id. § 5H1.4.
171. Id. § 5H1.5.
172. Id. § 5H1.6.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 5HIll..
175. Compare United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 775 (3d Cir. 2000) (upholding a
downward departure based upon charitable works of politician defendant convicted of perjury),
and United States v. Crouse, 145 F.3d 786, 790 (6th Cir. 1998) (deferring to the district court's
finding that the offender's civic involvement was sufficient to warrant a downward departure),
with United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding a district
court's refusal to depart downward for defendant's community service to groups and individuals
in the black community).
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In addition to the above considerations, a primary offense guideline
can identify factors that may be considered as supporting an upward or
downward departure. For the recently consolidated Fraud and Theft
Guideline, factors previously identified as departure considerations in
either section are now all present within the consolidated guideline.
Thus, under the new guideline, the "non-exhaustive list" of seven
factors 179 that a court may consider in determining whether an upward
departure is warranted includes conduct by the defendant that
endangered "the solvency or financial security of one or more
victims" 180 and conduct that "caused or risked substantial non-monetary
harm," 18 1 such as physical or psychological harm. Amended guideline
section 2B1.1 also indicates that a downward departure may be
warranted when "this guideline substantially overstates the seriousness
of the offense." 18 2 Historically, in economic crime cases, upward
departures from prescribed sentences have been rare compared to
downward departures. 183 The Supreme Court approved the exercise of
176. Compare United States v. Haversat, 22 F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming decision
to depart downward, insofar as it was based upon severe psychiatric problems of antitrust
defendant's wife), with United States v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95, 112-13 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 906 (2000) (reversing twelve-level downward departure based upon defendant's status
as a single parent whose oldest child suffered from a neurological disorder).
177. Compare United States v. Olbres, 99 F.3d 28, 35-37 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying Koon to
vacate and remand for resentencing, where district court categorically excluded tax defendants'
departure argument that absence from business to serve sentence would cause twelve innocent
persons to lose their jobs as a result of business' failure), and United States v. Milikowsky, 65
F.3d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding downward departure where antitrust defendant's absence
from business could have caused the loss of 150 to 200 jobs), with United States v. Sharapan, 13
F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing downward departure by a district court based upon a
finding that defendant's absence from business could have caused the loss of thirty jobs).
178. See Berman, supra note 43, at 56 (observing that district courts spend a great deal of
attention on whether to depart, but very little, if any, on the relationship of a departure to the
purposes of sentencing).
179. U.S.S.G. § 2BI.I cmt. n.15(A)(i)-(vii). The amended guideline has eliminated the
requirement that endangering the solvency of one or more victims be "knowing." Id. § 2Bl.I
cmt. n.15(A)(v). The elimination of the "knowing" requirement should provide support for
seeking upward departures in cases of loss of shareholder equity based upon self-dealing and
accounting misrepresentations. Compare id. § 2BI.l cmt. n.15(A)(v) (2001), with id. § 2FI.l
cmt. n. 1 (f) (2000) ("[Tlhe offense involved the knowing endangerment of the solvency of one or
more victims.").
180. Id. § 2B1.I cmt. n.15(A)(v).
181. Id. § 2Bl cmt. n.15(A)(ii) ("For example, the offense caused physical harm,
psychological harm, or severe emotional trauma, or resulted in a substantial invasion of a privacy
interest (through, for example, the theft of personal information such as medical, educational, or
financial records).").
182. Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.15(B).
183. For example, in the fraud primary offense category, 18.8% of the cases received
substantial assistance departures, 11.6% received other downward departures, and only 1.1%
received upward departures. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 56 tbl.27. Fraud is an unusual
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broad discretionary power by the district courts over departure
determinations 184 with its decision in Koon v. United States, 185 when it
held that such determinations were to be reviewed by the appellate
courts under an abuse of discretion standard, thus resolving a split in the
circuits.186
Koon and three co-defendants were police officers involved in a
widely publicized, videotaped beating of Rodney King, an AfricanAmerican man, by a group of white Los Angeles police officers. A
federal court convicted Koon and one of the three other defendants of
violating King's civil rights. 187
The sentencing court in Koon
primary offense category because it encompasses a wide range of criminal behavior, such as
racketeering and narcotics related criminality, as well as corporate corruption. Thus, the statistics
can be misleading. In the Tax primary offense category, 14.4% received substantial assistance
departures, 14% received other downward departures, and 0.3% received upward departures. Id.
In the Antitrust primary offense category, 47.4% received substantial assistance departures, 7.9%
received other downward departures, and there were no upward departures. Id. The overall
upward departure rate for all primary offense categories was 0.7%. Id. Thus, although this
Article is concerned with strengthening the Guidelines with respect to economic crimes (where
upward departures account for between only 0.0% and 1.2% of those cases), upward departures
are infrequent in nearly all primary offense categories except Murder (9.5%) and Manslaughter
(12.8%). Id.
184. Bowman & Heise, supra note 48, at 1116 (concluding that Koon was "intended as a
signal to district court judges ... [to] be more open to the . . . [use of] their departure power...
[and] to appellate courts to be less restrictive in reviewing departures"): Michael Goldsmith &
Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate
Departures, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2000) (arguing that the defense bar, district
judges, and some appellate courts have read Koon as restoring broad sentencing discretion where
other appellate courts have read Koon more narrowly).
185. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
186. The Supreme Court's ruling in Koon has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Berman,
supra note 43, at 74 (describing the Court's approach in Koon on the issue of discretion as
"schizophrenic"): Bowman, Places in the Heartland, supra note 136, at 19 (concluding that
conflicting signals by the Court regarding standards of appellate review make it "virtually
impossible" to predict Koon's effect on lower federal courts); Goldsmith & Porter, supra note
184, at 59 (arguing that Koon failed to resolve problems regarding which standard of review to
apply to district court decisions); Barry L. Johnson, Discretion and the Rule of Law in Federal
Guidelines Sentencing: Developing Departure Jurisprudence in the Wake of Koon v. United
States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1751 (1998) (noting that the Court's ruling in Koon is a potential
impediment to appellate review of sentencing departures); Kate Stith, The Hegemony of the
Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT. REP. 14, 14-18 (1996) (describing Koon as a puzzling
decision that has not really altered the discretion of sentencing judges). But see Kevin R. Reitz.
Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State
Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1441, 1466 (1997) (viewing the Supreme Court's holding in
Koon as an attempt to override the rigid application of the Sentencing Guidelines in appellate
cases).
The SRA provides that a court of appeals "shall accept the findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines
to the facts." 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000). Thus, it would appear that departure determinations
are given even broader discretion.
187. Koon. 518 U.S. at 88.
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determined that an eight-level downward departure from a sentencing
range of seventy to eighty-seven months down to thirty months was
warranted in the defendants' case based upon five factors: (1) the
victim's wrongful conduct; (2) the likelihood of abuse in prison due to
the publicity surrounding the case; (3) the collateral employment
consequences of Koon's conviction; (4) the burden of successive trials,
in that Koon had been prosecuted by the state on charges of assault and
excessive use of force but had been acquitted prior to the federal trial;
and (5) a finding that the defendants were not "violent" or "dangerous"
and, thus, were unlikely to engage in criminal conduct. 18 8 The district
court granted a five-level downward departure for the first factor and
found that the four other factors in combination warranted an additional
three-level departure. 189 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reviewed the departure decision de novo and reversed the district
court's decision concerning the downward departures. 190 That decision
was appealed.
The Supreme Court's decision in Koon set forth the relevant appellate
standard of review when considering departure decisions: abuse of
discretion by the sentencing court. 19 1 Had the Court ended the analysis
there, the message would have been clear. The abuse of discretion
standard would have returned to the district courts a substantial degree
of the discretionary authority that was lost as a result of the enactment
of the SRA and the subsequent development of the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Supreme Court, however, continued its analysis; it
stressed the necessity for sentencing courts to retain discretionary
authority in sentencing determinations, 192 but then went forward,
188. Id. at 89-90.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 90.
191. Id. at 91. The Court's emphasis on district court discretion is clear:
The goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is, of course, to reduce unjustified disparities
and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the distinguishing
marks of any principled system of justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide
uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.
This, too, must be remembered, however. It has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as
an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes
mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue. We do not
understand it to have been the congressional purpose to withdraw all sentencing
discretion from the United States district judge. Discretion is reserved within the
Sentencing Guidelines, and reflected by the standard of appellate review we adopt.
Id. at 113; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, at 25 (incorporating the
Koon holding into discretionary sentencing decisions), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
ANNRPT/2000/ar00toc.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT].
192. Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.
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independently
evaluating each factor relied upon by the sentencing
3
court.

19

The Court found that victim misconduct was a factor to be considered
in departure decisions and, further, that King's misconduct, which
provoked an aggravated assault under color of law, took the case out of
the "heartland" 194 of the applicable guideline, thus supporting a
downward departure. 195 The Court next considered the remaining four
factors relied upon by the sentencing court, reiterating that the
Guidelines do not restrict the number of factors a court may consider for
purposes of departures,196 nor maya court conclude categorically that a
factor may never be considered.
The Court applied the abuse of
discretion standard, reviewing each of the four factors. The Court
affirmed the appellate court's ruling with respect to the prospect of
employment termination and low risk of recidivism because the
Guidelines took into account both factors-the former falling within the
heartland of the offense 198 and the latter a consideration within the
criminal history category. 199 The Court sided with the sentencing court
with respect to the two remaining factors of susceptibility to abuse in
prison and successive prosecutions, finding that the emotional outrage
that accompanied the case took it outside the heartland and reversing the
court of appeals decision holding that emotional outrage based upon the
egregiousness of the crime fell squarely within the heartland. 20 0
The trend toward more frequent downward departures continued
unabated in the wake of Koon,20 1 with virtually no limit on a district
193. See id. at 101-12.
194. See supra note 136 (defining "heartland").
195. Koon, 518 U.S. at 105.
196. Id. at 106 ("The Guidelines, however, 'place essentially no limit on the number of
potential factors that may warrant a departure."' (quoting Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129,
136-37 (1991))).
197. Id. at 106-07, 109. Of course, as stated previously, the Guidelines do prohibit
consideration of sex, race, socio-economic status, and so forth as bases for departure from
prescribed sentences. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (identifying the factors
prohibited by the Guidelines for use when considering sentencing).
198. Koon, 518 U.S. at 110.
199. Id.at 111.
200. Id. at II1-12.
201. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 51 fig.G (bar graph reflecting five-year trend
from 1996 to 2000 in departure sentencing showing that within range sentences steadily
decreased from 69.6% to 64.5%, and downward departures not based upon substantial assistance
increased from 10.3% to 17% during that same period; upward departures lessened slightly over
the same five-year period from 0.9% to 0.7%); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at 51 fig.G (showing that overall downward departures
not based upon substantial assistance increased as follows: 6.6% in 1993, 7.6% in 1994, 8.4% in
1995; overall upward departures remained a minor percentage of departures: 1.1% in 1993, 1.2%
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court's discretion as to the extent of a departure, once the court made
the determination to depart. Those circuits that supported broader
exercise of sentencing discretion through departures from sentencing
ranges read the Koon decision to authorize the practice, whereas those
circuits that narrowly interpreted departure authority under the
Sentencing Guidelines read the Koon decision restrictively.
The
disparity between the circuits on departure rates is wider, but the overall
trend is toward more downward departures. 20 2 One district court judge,
who supports departures as necessary to a just system of sentencing,
concluded that "the same risk of disparity that existed under the pre[G]uidelines regime exists today because those two [departure]
provisions [in sections 5Kl.1 and 5K2.0] give judges as much
discretion in20 imposing
sentences as they had before the Sentencing
3
Guidelines."
B. The Rising Tide and the Tidal Wave
The disparity in departure practices under the Guidelines threatens to
2 4
undermine
their effectiveness
in white-collar
sentencing.
0 In the wake
of the United
States Supreme
Court decision
in Koon
v. United

in 1994, and 0.9% in 1995); Berman, supra note 43, at 73-79 (arguing that the Court's efforts in
Koon failed to create a more effective departure method and instead produced greater confusion
and disparity in the lower courts); Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 184, at 59-60 (asserting that
Koon compounded confusion in appellate courts over the appropriate review of departure
decisions perpetuating unwarranted sentencing disparity); see also Berman, supra note 43, at 84,
85 & nn.250-57 (collecting cases approving disparate extent of downward departures); Bowman
& Heise, supra note 48, at 1105 (arguing that U.S.S.G. § 3El.I, which allows a reduction for
"acceptance of responsibility," is merely an institutionalized incentive to accept guilty pleas).
202. A comparison of the 1995 Sentencing Commission statistics for the rate of nonsubstantial assistance departures with the 2000 statistics supports this conclusion: in 1995, the
overall rate was 8.4%, the Ninth Circuit rate was 16.8%, and the Fourth Circuit rate was 3.9%; in
2000, the overall rate was 17.0%, the Ninth Circuit rate was 37.9%, and the Fourth Circuit rate
was 5%. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 53-55 tbl.26; U.S. FED. SENTENCING
COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, 1995 FISCAL YEAR, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/judpack/jpl995.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003); see also Berman, supra
note 43, at 80-81 ("Post-Koon decisions reveal that Koon has liberalized the use of departure
authority only in courts already receptive to departures, while it has barely changed the status quo
in other circuits.").
203. John S. Martin, Jr., Foreword, The Role of the Departure Power in Reducing Injustice
and Unwarranted Disparity Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 259, 262-63
(2000) (observing the great disparity in the way individual judges grant downward departures in
cases not involving motions to depart for substantial assistance and comparing the Ninth Circuit's
36.4% rate of departures to the Fourth Circuit's 4.6% rate of departures in non-substantial
assistance cases).
204. See, e.g., supra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text (discussing the high rate of
departures in white-collar cases where the defendant was also convicted of money laundering
charges).
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States,205 the overall departure rate from Guidelines sentences has
increased nearly 17% from 1996 to 2000.206 In fiscal year 2000, over
30% of the sentences for fraud convictions included downward
departures and, thus, were outside the calculated sentencing range of the
Guidelines. 217 Post-Koon20 statistics reveal that the greatest increases
in departures are in the non-substantial assistance cases. 2° 9 The
downward departure change in substantial assistance fraud cases
increased 27.7%, while for non-substantial assistance fraud cases the
increase was 42.3%. 2 10 In fiscal year 2000, over 30% of the fraud
sentences included downward departures outside the recommended
sentencing range of the guideline. 2 11 When the court grants downward
departures in white-collar crime cases, the median percent decrease
from the Guidelines minimum is often significant, 2 12 with 99 to 100%
205. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
206. See Percent of Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure, Fiscal Year 1996-Fiscal
Year 2000, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 51 fig.G. Overall departure rates have risen
over five percentage points, from 30.4% in 1996 to 35.5% in 2000. Id.
207. Id. at 56 tbl.27. Of the 5775 fraud offenders, 68.6% of convictions listed in the primary
offense category of fraud were sentenced within the range; 18.8% received departures based on
substantial assistance, and 11.6% received other downward departures. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1
208. See supra Part ILI.A (discussing United States v. Koon).
209. The percentage of other downward departures increased from 6.7% in fiscal year 1995 to
11.6% in fiscal year 2000, while the percentage of upward departures in fraud cases barely
changed, ranging from a low of 0.7% in fiscal year 1999 to a high of 1.6% in fiscal year 1998.
Substantial assistance departures for fraud fluctuated over the period 1995 to 2000 from a low of
14.6% in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 18.8% in fiscal year 2000, or just over 4%. See Percent of
Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure, Fiscal Year 1996-Fiscal Year 2000, 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 51 fig.G; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, AND CIRCUIT, 1995 FISCAL YEAR, at 14 tbl.9, available at
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING
http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm;
STATISTICS BY STATE, 1996 FISCAL YEAR, at 14 tbl.9, available at http://www.ussc.gov/
linktojp.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, 1997
FISCAL YEAR, at 14 tbl.9, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ linktojp.htm; U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, 1998 FISCAL YEAR, at 14 tbl.9,
available at http://www.ussc.gov/ linktojp.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, 1999 FISCAL YEAR, at 14 tbl.9, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/linktojp.htm.
210. Supra note 209 (of 5664 defendants convicted of fraud in 1995, 850 received substantial
assistance departures, whereas in 2000, 1084 of the 5775 defendants convicted of fraud received
such departures).
211. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 56 tbl.27. Of the 5775 fraud offenders, 1084
(18.8%) received departures based upon substantial assistance, and 669 (11.6%) received other
downward departures. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.1.
212. The median percent decrease from the Guidelines minimum in non-substantial assistance
departures for white-collar crimes is astounding: Fraud 99.2%, Embezzlement 99.7%, Antitrust
60% (only three cases), and Tax 100%. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 62 tbl.31. The
median decrease in terms of months from the Guidelines' minimum ranges from six months to
twenty-four months, with a median sentence of zero months imprisonment for any of the above
categories except Antitrust (which had a median sentence of eight months but included only three

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

decreases, resulting in no term of imprisonment for those white-collar
offenders awarded departures. 2 13 Thus, if departure trends continue,
even though the Fraud and Theft Guideline was revised to take into
account sentencing factors that are identified as relevant under the
particular guideline, it is probable that nearly one-third of defendants
will escape the more severe punishment of the amended Guidelines.
Notably, only sixty-one defendants, or 1.1% of those sentenced under
the fraud guideline in 2000, received upward departures. 2 14 In fact, the
United States Sentencing Commission 2000 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics reveals that even when sentenced within the
Guidelines' recommended range, white-collar offenders2 15consistently
found themselves sentenced at the lowest end of the range.
The downward departures include both those recommended by
prosecutors 2 16 and those determined otherwise. At least two studies of
sentencing statistical data suggest an inverse relationship between the
2 17
number of substantial assistance departures and judicial departures.
defendants). Id. The median percent decreases from the Guidelines' minimums for substantial
assistance departures reveal similar results: Fraud 99.7%, Embezzlement 99.6%, and 100% for
Tax and Antitrust. Id. at 61 tbl.30. The decreases in sentences ranged from six months to twelve
months, with a median sentence of zero months. Id. By contrast, for these offense categories,
there were upward departures in only forty-eight Fraud cases (where defendants in 4922 of the
cases were sentenced within or below the sentencing range). Id. at 59-63 tbls.29-32.
213. In United States v. Thompson, 190 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. Mass. 2002), Judge Gorton found
that "[o]f the 48 cases [in the District of Massachusetts] in which downward departures were
given, just over 60% were in white collar cases, largely involving defendants with advantaged
backgrounds." See Gertner, supra note 43, at 23 (noting that poor defendants were less likely to
receive downward departures than more advantaged white-collar defendants).
214. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 56 tbl.27. The 1.1% figure is high relative to other
historical white-collar crimes: Embezzlement (0.2%), Bribery (0.9%), Tax (0.3%), and Antitrust
(0.0%). Id.
215. Id. at 59 tbl.29. Statistics show the percentage of offenders sentenced at the Guidelines'
minimum for the following primary offenses to be as follows: Fraud 61.4%, Embezzlement
68.1%, Bribery 76.7%, Tax 76.1%, and Antitrust 100%. Id. By contrast, those offenders
sentenced at the Guidelines' maximum were as follows: Fraud 12.1%, Embezzlement 4.1%,
Bribery 1.7%, Tax 5.4%, and Antitrust 0.0%. Id. In comparison, the overall percentage of
offenses sentenced at the Guidelines' minimum is 62.7%; the percentage of those sentenced at the
Guidelines' maximum is 13.2%. Id.
216. See U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 (setting forth the policy for departures for substantial assistance);
Id. § 6B1.2(b)(2) (providing that a recommended sentence or agreed upon sentence may depart
from the applicable Guidelines range "for justifiable reasons").
217. See Lisa M. Farabee, DisparateDeparturesUnder the FederalSentencing Guidelines: A
Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 630, 631 (1998) (Connecticut prosecutors were less
likely to seek departures as a result of the judiciary's willingness to depart); Ian Weinstein,
SubstantialAssistance and Sentence Severity: Is There a Correlation?,II FED. SENT. REP. 83, 84
(1998) (noting that the pattern of departures suggests that judges balance judicial use of
departures under § 5K2.0 with prosecutorial use of departures under § 5K2. 1); see also Frank 0.
Bowman III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on "Substantial
Assistance" DeparturesFollows a Decade of ProsecutorialIndiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7,
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The studies do not concentrate solely on economic crime sentencing
data; the overall picture, however, is one of chaos and disregard for the
intended limited opportunity for departures in sentencing of federal
criminal cases. 2 18 Even where case law appears to provide some
guidance as to when a factor should be persuasive support for departure,
the abuse of discretion standard affords no true review of whether2 19a
particular court identified a compelling reason to depart.
60-62 (1999) (examining the apparent inverse relationship between the number of substantial
assistance departures and the number of non-5Kl.1 judicial departures in a district or region)
[hereinafter Bowman, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow].
218. Although not limited to economic crime cases, statistics reveal that plea agreements were
the leading reason given (18.3%) for downward departures in cases in which departures were not
a result of substantial assistance. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 52 tbl.25. Thus, the
substantial assistance statistics do not reveal the entire picture of cooperation among the
prosecutors, judges, and defendants in avoiding the "mandated" results of the Guidelines. See id.
(providing the statistics for downward departures not based on substantial assistance).
219. The Supreme Court expects comparison among cases for purposes of determining when a
factor falls outside the heartland of the Guidelines. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98
(1996) ("District courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making
[departure] determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases than appellate
courts do."). For example, a key factor apparently relied upon by courts in granting downward
departures for the care of a family member appears to be the indispensability of the defendant in
the care-taking responsibilities. See, e.g., United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76 (Ist Cir. 2001)
(denying downward departure to a defendant convicted of tax offenses and commercial bribery
offenses, where there were alternative sources of care available for elderly parents); United States
v. Sweeting, 213 F.3d 95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 906 (2000) (reversing a twelve-level
downward departure based upon defendant's status as a single parent whose oldest child suffered
from a neurological disorder); United States v. Saffer, 118 F. Supp. 2d 546, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(denying defendant's motion for downward departure, reasoning that while a "defendant's
indispensable role in caring for a seriously ill relative may be grounds for a departure[,]...
[w]here ... the defendant's role may be filled by another person, a departure is not warranted");
United States v. Wehrbein, 61 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Neb. 1999) (where defendant had already
served state term of imprisonment for criminal actions, court granted departure sufficient to avoid
incarceration on federal criminal conviction where child suffering from major mental illness was
especially dependant upon defendant); United States v. Lopez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Pa.
1998) (granting downward departure where seven-year-old daughter had attempted suicide
several times after her mother was arrested); Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Gender and Sentencing:
Family Responsibility and Dependent Relationship Factors, 8 FED. SENT. REP. 145, 145 (1995)
(noting that departure jurisprudence does not allow for considerations of culpability in light of
family circumstances).
Nevertheless, care for a family member was cited in part in the departure granted to Michael
Milken. In 1990, Michael Milken pled guilty to six counts of securities fraud violations and was
sentenced to ten years imprisonment under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Milken's
Prison Term Reduced, Parole Possible in Seven Months, FINANCIAL POST (Toronto), Aug. 6,
1992, at 7; Thomas S. Mulligan, The 50 People Who Most Influenced Business This Century;
Legitimizing Junk Bonds Will Be Milken's Legacy; Michael Milken (1946 - ), Junk Bond
Impresario, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 46, available at 1999 WL 26189115 (noting that
Milken served twenty-two months at a federal prison camp and paid $1.1 billion in fines and
penalties). Less than two years after he began serving his sentence, he was released to a half-way
house as a result of a federal district judge's decision to reduce the minimum amount of time
from three years to two years that Milken would be required to serve before being considered for
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Nevertheless, it is extremely likely that if past statistical trends are an
indicator, at least 30% of the cases that will fall under the 2001
Economic Crime Package will never encounter the greater severity in
sentencing for moderate and high-loss cases, escaping, instead, out the
backdoor of departure jurisprudence. Given that the sentencing factors
that may be considered are infinitely innumerable, 2 2 defense counsel
22
would be well advised to seek downward departures in every case. 1
The rising tide of departures continues to erode the foundation of the
Sentencing Guidelines, while a tidal wave looms over the goal of
uniformity in sentencing, threatening to wash it away. As the stream of
reports of deceptive accounting scandals rocks the American financial
markets, two questions emerge: first, whether the pursuit of punishment
against those who fostered the accounting scandals restrains the everexpanding departure practices, and second, whether the amendments in

parole. The judge based the departure upon a finding of substantial assistance by Milken in an
ongoing investigation into corruption on Wall Street, despite a letter from the head of the SEC's
enforcement division informing the judge that he did not believe Milken had fully cooperated by
disclosing all the wrongdoing of which he was aware. See Jill Dutt, Milken's Term Cut; Tycoon
Could Be Halfway Out Next Month, NEWSDAY, Aug. 6, 1992, at 32. The judge relied upon a
statement from the United States Attorney's Office that Milken had provided substantial
assistance and found that "Milken was a 'model prisoner,' that he was 'the chief catalyst' in the
bankruptcy settlement of his former employer, Drexel Burnham Lambert, and that a member of
his immediate family is ill." Id.
It is not extraordinary to have a white-collar criminal who is a "model prisoner." See Michael
L. Benson & Francis T. Cullen, The Special Sensitivity, of White-Collar Offender to Prison: A
Critique and Research Agenda, 15 CRIM. JUST. 207, 212 (1988) (observing that white-collar
criminals tend to adjust well to prison life once they overcome the initial shock of the
experience). Moreover, Milken, renown for his ability to negotiate deals, was also the chief
catalyst in the events leading to his employer's bankruptcy. Finally, it is rare for an inmate to be
released early from imprisonment because of the illness of an immediate member of the family.
Given Milken's vast wealth, the need to act personally as caretaker of a family member is an
incredible justification for early release. The "extraordinary" factors led to an 80% reduction in
Milken's total imprisonment term. Id.
220. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (explaining that the Guidelines place no limit
on the number of potential factors that may warrant a departure).
221. See 1 ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 5-5 (Phylis Skloot Bamberger & David J. Gottlieb eds., 4th ed. 2001)
(recognizing the "expanding bases of departure under § 3553(b) and § 5K2.0 ... [as] the principal
escape hatch from the guideline grid"). The authors further advise that:
Creative counsel should strive to develop a record of mitigating factors relating to the
defendant's criminal conduct, extraordinary personal characteristics, and any other
unusual circumstances that take a case outside the "heartland" for which a guideline
was drafted. Conversely, counsel should oppose upward departures by arguing that the
aggravating factor relied on by the court was taken fully into account in formulating
the applicable guidelines, and it constitutes an abuse of discretion to depart upward
because the factor was not present in a substantially greater than normal degree.
I Id. at 5-5 to 5-6.
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the Guidelines actually lead to retribution in the form of longer terms of
imprisonment and, ultimately, deterrence of future economic crime.
IV. GUIDING ECONOMIC CRIME REFORM

A. Economic Crime and Capitalism
The justice system, government, and economy in the United States
are closely intertwined; each sector influences the other. Cases like
Enron dramatically illustrate the overlap among the sectors. The
collapse of Enron sent shock waves through the economy. Investigation
into the aftermath of Enron's bankruptcy revealed the corporation's
dogged use of political campaign contributions to influence energy
industry regulation and to gain special access to key political leaders in
the legislative and executive branches of government. 2 22 Over time,
Enron's collapse uncovered and exposed a deeply rooted disease
infecting the overall health of our economy.
Large corporations like Enron are prized clients to accounting firms,
brokerage houses, and banks. 2 23 Their business is so valued that
companies in the financial services industries willfully bend their
fiduciary responsibilities to maintain a satisfactory business
relationship. Thus, Arthur Andersen willingly structured off-the-books
2 24
transactions to hide losses and enhance earnings for Enron.
Andersen's willingness to keep its clients happy, lest it lose their
business, was not an unfounded concern. In 2000, Xerox dismissed
222. Eichenwald, supra note 3.
223. See generally David Barboza & Barnaby J. Feder, Enron's Man)' Strands: The
Transactions: Enron's Swap with Qwest Is Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at Cl,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting on investigation into
whether deals between Enron and Qwest Telecommunications to swap fiber optic network
capacity and services "were legitimate transactions or sham deals meant to lift revenues
artificially"): see also Gretchen Morgenson, Telecom, Tangled in Its Own Web, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2002, § 3, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting on
the interlocking relationships among telecommunications companies including transactions
involving swapping network capacity, and reporting that a few bankruptcies are fueling a larger
number of bankruptcies, which threaten the collapse of the industry).
224. For example, Andersen external accountants willingly accepted the face value placed by
Andersen internal accountants on market-to-market trades, permitting current earnings to be
recognized for speculative future gains. Michael Brick, What Was the Heart of Enron Keeps
Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at Cl, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York
Times File; see also Kurt Eichenwald, Negotiations by Andersen with KPMG Fall Apart, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at Cl, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File
(reporting on e-mail exchanges between Andersen's Chicago and Houston offices in 1999, where
the Chicago office concluded that the accounting of a complex Enron transaction was not
permissible, but the Houston office refused to tell Enron to go back on the deal because there
would be a $30 million to $50 million charge).
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KPMG as its auditor and hired rival PricewaterhouseCoopers after
KPMG forced Xerox to restate financial results for that year, reducing
shareholder equity by $137 million and tangible net worth by $76
million. 225 Likewise, UBS PaineWebber fired a broker in its Houston
office within hours of receiving a complaint from Enron concerning the
broker's August 2001 recommendation to clients to take some money
invested in Enron "off the table" because of the company's deteriorating
financial situation. 226 PaineWebber informed Enron of the firing,
apologized for the broker's conduct, and sent a message to the broker's
clients that evening, retracting the broker's advice and attaching a report
with a "strong buy" recommendation for Enron. 22 7 PaineWebber had
an exclusive arrangement with Enron concerning Enron employees'
stock option and deferred benefit plans, which may explain, though not
excuse, the complicity of PaineWebber in protecting Enron's financial
reputation despite its responsibilities to investors relying on
PaineWebber's advice. 228 The incestuous role of investment bankers in
the corporate scandal is only beginning to be unveiled.22 9
B. Civil Recovery and Its Limits
The Economic Crime Package limits the calculation of loss to the
greater of intended loss and actual loss, which is the "reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm" resulting from the offense. 23 In defining
225.

Floyd Norris & Claudia H. Deutsch, Xerox to Restate Results and Pay Big Fine, N.Y.

TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at CI, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. This

Article reports Xerox's agreement to pay a $10 million fine to settle an SEC fraud investigation,
the largest civil fine ever reportedly paid by a company in an accounting case. Id. The previous
record was a $3.5 million civil fine paid by America Online in a 2000 settlement with SEC. Id.
In 2001, Arthur Andersen settled civil fraud allegations involving audits of its client, Waste
Management, agreeing to pay a $7 million fine. Id.
226. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Man Who Paid the Price for Sizing Up Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 2002, at CI, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File. The fired
broker's recommendation occurred only four months before Enron became the largest corporation
at that time to declare bankruptcy. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Corporations that generate large profits present lower investment risk. Thus, complex
financial relationships between investment bankers and corporations like Enron are expected.
The revelation that bank loans were provided for off-the-books partnerships and that bankers
engaged in self-dealing by personally investing in the partnerships that operated to move
"hundreds of millions of dollars in loans off [Enron's] books" was disturbing because of the selfdealing and the magnitude of the personal gains, both of which suggest an abdication of any
fiduciary responsibility to the banks they represented or the investors in both the banks and
Enron. Kurt Eichenwald & David Barboza, Enron Criminal Investigation is Said to Expand to
Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York
Times File.
230. U.S.S.G. § 2B 1.1 cmt. n.2(A)(i).
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"pecuniary harm,"

the Guidelines specifically exclude "emotional
distress, harm to reputation, or other non-economic harm." 2 3 1 The
Sentencing Commission placed this limit on loss calculations to address
the desire that courts not assign monetary value to intangible, but
reasonably foreseeable, harms in232criminal cases that would be more
aptly addressed as civil damages.
While avoiding non-pecuniary harms in criminal sentencings may be
an efficient use of resources, civil litigation is limited both in redressing
such harms and in providing real deterrence. Even when economic
crime has been criminally prosecuted, the materials gathered in support
of such prosecutions are often protected under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e) as grand jury materials subject to secrecy so that parties
must still wade through the civil discovery process. 23 3 While a plea of
guilty may establish wrongdoing, the civil plaintiff must still establish
that the wrongdoing directly caused her harm and must still prove her
damages.
Recovery for pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms through the civil
laws for conversion, fraud, breach of contract, and securities fraud poses
a host of problems for victims. First, the law must actually provide for
civil recovery in a meaningful manner.
The litigation "reform"
movement of the past decade has, in general, continuously reduced the
availability of civil remedies. For example, while an individual may sue
for securities fraud, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995234 ("PSLRA") has effectively limited successful lawsuits by
placing on plaintiffs various procedural burdens, such as heightened
23 5
pleading requirements in federal courts that act as barriers to suit.
Further restricting civil remedies, the Securities Litigation Uniform

231. Id. § 2BI.L cmt. n.2(A)(iii).
232. Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51. at 50. Professor Bowman notes that throughout
the five-year debate over the economic crime package, "there was never any support for including
non-economic harms in loss." Id. at 49.
233.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).

234. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
235. See Ramirez, supra note 4, at 1072-79 (discussing the heightened pleading standards as a
result of the PSLRA). In addition to the heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA, courts
must impose sanctions for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which
includes awarding attorney's fees and costs; heightened causation standards tighten the ability to
wage class actions lawsuits. Id. Professor Ramirez concludes that such reforms have led to "the
de facto de-federalization of private securities claims." Id. at 1080 (discussing the effects of the
PSLRA). States have followed the lead of the PSLRA in enacting similar legislation. Id. at 1081
(noting the desire of states to encourage business development within their borders and stating
that Arizona has already passed legislation modeled after the PSLRA).
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Standards Act of 1998236 precluded state court securities litigation
involving publicly traded companies by requiring such suits to be
brought in federal courts. 23 7 The recently enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act
does not provide a real expansion for private civil remedies to corporate
fraud.2 3 8 Second, legislative barriers to lawsuits and limited liability
provisions increase both the cost and the risk of filing lawsuits and
thereby exacerbate other impediments to civil remedies. Thus, the
victim must have the resources to investigate, initiate, and maintain the
lawsuit, or convince a lawyer to take the risk on a contingent basis.
Meanwhile, although the loss to one victim might not be enough to
justify the cost of a civil suit, the gain to the offender from the
combined loss to many victims may satisfy or justify the risk of the cost
of a criminal suit. 239 Finally, even a successful civil action is useless
240
against those offenders with few or hidden resources.
Historically, the economic arguments against prison terms for
economic crime offenders have been plentiful.2 4 ' One argument against
236. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78).
237. Id. § 101 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb); Steven A. Ramirez, Depolitizing Financial
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 533 (2000) (discussing the effects of enacting the
Uniform Act).
238. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 801-1107, 116 Stat.
745, 800-10 (to be codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.) see Steven A.
Ramirez. Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law & Macroeconomics of Investor Confidence, 42
WASHBURN L.J. 31, 65 (2002).
239. The gain to the offender may justify the risk of the cost of a criminal suit particularly
because most securities litigation settles before trial for pennies on the dollar. Dan Carney, Don't
Toss this Stock-Fraud law. Just Fix It, Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 86 (showing average
settlements on private stock fraud litigation of 7.2% of estimated shareholder loss), available at
2002 WL 9362591. The slow dance of contemporary federal litigation gives the advantage to the
defendant who has the use of the fraudulently obtained resources both to enjoy for the present and
to pay for a well-heeled defense. See Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) (comparing federal civil litigation to a dance marathon
where the object of the contest is to be the last party standing).
240. The problem with collecting individually obtained civil judgments is also seen in the area
of criminal fines and restitution and in disgorgement. See John D. Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime
and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 419, 437 (1980) (observing that large fines can be avoided by hiding assets, diverting
expected income, overstating expenses, or hiring "superior legal talent to resist collection
efforts"). Although the SEC won disgorgement orders of $632 million in 2002, only $73 million
(or 12%) has been collected, the remainder either spent on legal fees or hidden from access.
Paula Dwyer et al., Making Execs Give Back the Cash, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 2002, at 36, available
at 2002 WL 9362737. Attorney Robert J. Mintz notes that an "unintended consequence of the
[Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002] ... is that it could encourage CEOs to move funds offshore
without a trace-just in case." Id.
241. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing CorporateMisconduct, 60
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 31-34 (1997) (observing that corporate misconduct is particularly
suitable to civil sanctions because monetary sanctions are available, corporate plaintiffs are

2003] Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 405
"lengthy" imprisonment for white-collar offenders is that such offenders
will realize a greater level of "loss" compared to the average offender
because of lost earnings while incapacitated, and possibly a long-term
loss of ability to earn top dollar as a result of the perception that the
offender is a criminal. 2 42 Another argument is that it costs tax dollars to
imprison a person, and the longer the sentence, the more it costs.
Requiring economic crime offenders to pay large fines and restitution in
lieu of imprisonment gives back to the victim and the community in a
way that imprisonment cannot. 243 Imposing a term of imprisonment,
24 4
however, does not exclude the opportunity to impose other sanctions.
abundant, and public agencies exist to enforce such sanctions). See generally Richard A. Posner,
Optimal Sentences for White Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409 (1980) (asserting that
white-collar criminals should be punished only by fines and not imprisonment because fines are
an equally effective deterrent). But see Coffee, supra note 240, at 434-35 (noting that there is a
practical "boundary" on the ability to collect fines large enough to deter white-collar crime).
242. But see WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 63, at 118-125 (finding little difference on the toll
taken by the judicial process on white-collar criminals compared to common criminals, but whitecollar offenders suffer more extra-judicial punitive effects); Benson & Cullen, supra note 219, at
212 (concluding from interviews with previously imprisoned white-collar criminals that, as a
group, they were able to adjust well to prison life).
243. See Lynch, supra note 241, at 31-33 (discussing the question of why corporate
misconduct is a suitable area for the application of civil sanctions); Posner, supra note 241, at 410
(explaining why fines rather than prison sentences should be given to white-collar criminals). But
see inira note 264 (comparing white-collar crime to other types of crime).
244. The Guidelines provide for mandatory restitution for "offenses committed against
property, including any offense committed by fraud or deceit" unless "the number of identifiable
victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable ...[or determining such] losses would
complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to
any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process." U.S.S.G. § 5EI.l(b)(l)-(2).
Restitution shall be included so long as such order is authorized under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593, 2248,
2259, 2264. 2327. 3663, 3663A(a), or 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), or if not authorized under 18 U.S.C. §
3663(a)(1), but otherwise meets the criteria for an order of restitution under that section.
Additionally, it can be difficult to collect fines and restitution, adding one more opportunity for
the offender to avoid punishment even after he is detected and convicted. See KLEIN, supra note
43, at 163-69 (discussing restitution as an alternative in federal sentencing).
In fact, there are numerous sentencing options that can be imposed in addition to imprisonment.
Part F of Chapter 5 of the Guidelines provides additional "Sentencing Options." The Background
Commentary to U.S.S.G. § 5FI.4 provides, in part:
In cases where a defendant has been convicted of an offense involving fraud or "other
intentionally deceptive practices," the court may order the defendant to "give
reasonable notice and explanation of the conviction, in such form as the court may
approve" to the victims of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3555. The court may order the
notice to be given by mail, by advertising in specific areas or through specific media,
or by other appropriate means. In determining whether a notice is appropriate, the
court must consider the generally applicable sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) and the cost involved in giving the notice as it relates to the loss caused by the
crime. The court may not require the defendant to pay more than $20,000 to give
notice.
U.S.S.G. § 5FI.4, cmt. Community service provides an excellent opportunity for the court to
require the offender to give back to the community from which she wrongfully took in
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committing her crime, as well as to reconnect to the community. Creative placement of whitecollar offenders, such as requiring physicians convicted of health care fraud crimes to provide
free medical care in clinics and requiring accountants convicted of tax crimes to keep books for
charitable organizations, may be a marriage made in crime and punishment heaven-so long as
the offender does not transfer her criminal skills to the task assigned. Szockyj, supra note 72, at
498-99 (discussing alternatives to serving prison sentences).
U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a) provides for the imposition of occupational restrictions:
The court may impose a condition of probation or supervised release prohibiting the
defendant from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession, or
limiting the terms on which the defendant may do so, only if it determines that:
(1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation,
business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and
(2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public
because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will
continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant
was convicted.
U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a).
The Commentary following § 5F1.5 cautions that imposition of occupational restrictions should
be used for the sole purpose of protecting the public and not "as a means of punishing the
convicted person."
U.S.S.G. § 5FI.5, cmt. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also provides for
occupational restrictions to prohibit persons from serving as officers or directors, although the
power to do so under the Act is granted to the SEC. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, § 1105, 116 Stat. 745, 809-10 (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-3, and the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
grants authority to the SEC to prohibit persons from serving as officers or directors
of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports pursuant to section
15(d) of that Act, if the conduct of that person demonstrates unfitness to serve as an
officer or director of any such issuer.
Id. 116 Stat. 745, 810 (amending I5 U.S.C. § 77h- 1). The imposition of occupational restrictions
as a condition of probation or supervised release has been upheld by the circuit courts when
challenged. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 452 (9th Cir. 1999) (preventing
defendant from working in law office or "any institution in the business of providing legal
services"); United States v. Choate, 101 F.3d 562, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1996) (preventing defendant
from maintaining self-employment); United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir.
1992) (preventing defendant from working in used-car industry); United States v. Burnett, 952
F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1991) (preventing defendant from working in business that requires travel
or selling vending machines). Such restrictions may be appropriate in fraud and insider trading
cases.
Forfeiture under U.S.S.G. § 5E1.4, as discussed in Part I.B, supra, may be sought in
connection with money laundering charges. Disgorgement and debarment are civil sanctions that
may be imposed by governmental agencies as a consequence of a criminal conviction. For
example, in 1985, E. F. Hutton & Company, Inc. ("EFH"), one of the largest securities dealers in
the United States, pleaded guilty to 2000 counts of mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1341 and 1343. Kathleen F. Brickey, CORPORATE WHITE COLLAR CRIME CASES AND
MATERIALS 640 (1990) (reproducing Department of Justice Press Release dated May 2, 1985,
and portions of EFH's 1985 10-k report). Subsequently, the United States Department of Labor
notified EFH of its inquiry into whether debarment provisions of Section 411 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 should be implemented to "restrict EFH from acting as
an administrator or investment advisor to employee benefit plans." Id. at 646 (reproducing
portions of EFH's 1985 10-k report). Disgorgement is available to the SEC as an equitable
remedy under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77g.
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C. Purposeful Punishment
As America's ship neared the iceberg, the immensity of the situation
became apparent. Each week brought headlines of another corporation
"restating" earnings to reflect billions of dollars in losses. 245 More
Americans were invested in America's financial markets than at any
time in its history. 2 46 The implosion of the financial markets rocked the
very foundation upon which middle-class America rests its future.
American financial markets rely upon accurate and honest information.
When civil remedies cannot protect the goals of government, the
criminal process provides both the additional incentive to follow the
rule of law and the measured force to chastise those who do not.
Economic crime offenders pose a threat to the efficiency of the
business and financial markets, 247 confidence in government, and faith
in the justice system. In our complex society, people must rely upon the
Nearly
professionalism of others to accomplish their goals. 24 8
overnight, our political leaders awoke to the realization that harsher
penalties for economic criminals were needed. 249 Just as the politicians
used the "scorched earth" approach in the war on drugs, 25 it is now the
corporate executive who darkens the driveways of modern suburbia.

245. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder & Seth Schiesel, WorldCom Finds $3.3 Billion More in
Irregularities,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New
York Times File; Simon Romero & Alex Berenson, WorldCom Says It Hid Expenses, Inflating
Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library,
The New York Times File.
246. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 2000, at 55 (2000) (finding that 43.6%
of the United States adult population owned stock directly or indirectly as of 1998, up 21% from
1995); Edward Wyatt, Share of Wealth in Stock Holdings Hits 50-Year High, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 1998, at AI, available at LEXIS, News Library, The New York Times File (reporting that
Americans have more of their assets invested in the stock market than at any time in the last fifty
years, and perhaps ever).
247. See Jeffrey Rubin, Ahead of the Curve: Companies Still Can't Shake Off Corporate
Credit Blues, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 6, 2003, at B7 (reporting that "[ciredit spreads, or
the extra interest that corporate borrowers must pay compared with government borrowers, are
the widest they have been for some time. Before the recent credit rally in late fall, they were
basically at the widest levels since the Depression of the 1930s."). The article attributes the wide
spreads to the corporate malfeasance and accounting scandals beginning with Enron and
WorldCom. Id. The article further reports a six-quarter decline in bank lending to the United
States business sector. Id.
248. See Ramirez, supra note 4, at 1056-57 (discussing the need for public "confidence in the
integrity of our financial markets in order to insure a stable and inexpensive source of capital for
American business growth").
249. See supra Part lI.C (discussing the political process leading to passage of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002).
250. The percentage of the federal prison population in Federal Bureau of Prison facilities for
sentenced drug offenders compared to the total sentenced population has increased steadily over
the past three decades from 16.3% in 1970, to 24.9% in 1980, to 52.2% in 1990, and to 56.9% in
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The Economic Crime Package recognizes that for large-dollar
economic crime offenders a fine without imprisonment fails.25 ' With
scandal upon scandal, the public cannot afford to ignore the nefarious
nature of economic crime and blindly disregard the human fallout from
economic harm imposed on victims. 252 The United States taxpayer
253
continues to pay for the bailout of the Savings and Loan industry,
while Medicare recipients get no relief on prescription medicine costs
because of a national budget that cannot afford to assist them. 254 The

dual purposes of retribution and deterrence support longer terms of
imprisonment developed in the Economic Crime Package for large
pecuniary fraud.

1. Retribution
Criminal law "defines the minimum conditions of man's
responsibility to his fellows and holds him to that responsibility. 25 5
When a law is violated, the ability of the offender to disregard the rules

2000, with a high of 61.3% in 1994. Federal Bureau of Prisons Quick Facts, May 2002, at
http://www.bop.gov/fact0598.html#Drug (last visited Jan. 18, 2003).
251. [Pjrison is the distinctive sanction of the criminal law because it fulfills a
pedagogical function that fines do not. Not only are prisons highly visible
reminders of the deterrent threat of the law, but the use of imprisonment broadcasts
a special communitarian message about the equality of all citizens before the law.
Because of the wealth differences among offenders and the declining marginal
utility of money, fines cannot communicate this message, and, when used as an
alternative to imprisonment, may undercut it.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 224 (1991) (discussing how
criminal law is a system of moral education).
252. A comparison of the economic loss/gain for conventional crimes versus white-collar
crimes revealed that just over 2% of conventional non-violent crimes involved more than
$110,000, whereas nearly 30% of white-collar crimes involved at least that amount. Stanton
Wheeler et al., White-Collar Crimes and Criminals, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331, 337-38 (1988)
(contrasting white-collar and conventional crime); see also STEPHEN M. ROSOFF ET AL., PROFIT
WITHOUT HONOR: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE LOOTING OF AMERICA 409-14 (1998)
(estimating that the economic cost of white-collar crime is more than $40 billion for personal
fraud alone).
253. The Savings and Loans bailout has been variously estimated at between $200 and $500
billion, with a conservative estimate that at least $6 billion was attributed to fraud. POVEDA,
supra note 72, at II (discussing definitions of white-collar crime).
254. See, e.g., ROSOFF ET AL., supra note 252, at 410 (noting that the Savings and Loan
bailout forced reductions of government spending on social services); Robert Pear, Senate Kills
Planfor Drug Benefits Through Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at Al, available at LEXIS,
News Library, The New York Times File (discussing the Senate's 2002 failure to pass legislation
providing prescription drug benefits promised to the elderly).
255. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
410 (1958) (discussing why it is difficult to have only one theory of criminal law).
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256
and get away scot-free has a negative effect on the public at large.
Offenders breach their responsibility to society to conform to and abide
by its rules. Faith in the system is eroded, and the willingness of others
in that society to follow rules that are unenforced is discouraged. "Law
must not only preserve the society; it must, in addition, serve its ideals

and values .... One overriding value [is that of] justice." 257 Proponents

of the retributive theory assume that those who commit crimes choose
evil over good and that, as responsible moral agents for their acts, those
offenders deserve punishment. 25 8 Moreover, retribution stamps upon
the offender 2the
title of criminal, a sanction in itself in that it stigmatizes
59
the offender.

Some critics of the retributive theory view vengeance as its primary
motivation and, as such, maintain that it lacks moral justification for
punishment because it "invites the public and the legal system 260
to
indulge the passion for revenge untroubled by moral qualms."
256. ROSOFF ET AL., supra note 252, at 414-15 (discussing the social costs of white-collar
criminality as promoting "disrespect for the law among ordinary citizens and ... ready
rationalizations for potential street criminals seeking to justify their misconduct"); see also infra
note 273 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that criminals deny their conduct).
Steven Box writes that "too many people have been socialized to see crime and criminals
through the eyes of the state." STEVEN Box, POWER, CRIME, AND MYSTIFICATION 14 (1983).
Because the state perpetuated and publicized the view that street crime was the criminal force in
society, corporate crime was largely ignored. Id. at 3-4, 12-15. Since the growing recognition
that victimization from corporate crime is far more devastating than "conventional" crime, the
drive to place effective controls on corporate crime has been accelerated. Id. at 12-15 (discussing
the commonly unknown effects of corporate crime). The rapid passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, cheerfully signed into law by a conservative president, addressing corporate fraud
and conflicts of interest, is a testament to the speed with which measures are taken when attention
is drawn to the widespread devastation of alleged corporate crime. See also POVEDA, supra note
72, at 4.
257. WILLARD GAYLIN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF BIAS IN SENTENCING 5 (1974).
258. See CRIMINAL LAW 3-4 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 1997).
259. See Hart, supra note 255, at 404 ("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it. it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which
accompanies and justifies its imposition.").
260. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivisn, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1652 (1992).
Certainly, if the justice system merely replaced the victim in imposing vengeance through
punishment, one could be satisfied with the assertion that retribution encourages indulgence in the
passions of revenge. Moreover, those who committed crimes like murdering a child rapist would
go free entirely, assuming community support for such action, since there would be no personal
anger to avenge. The system of "just deserts" permits the law to temper the flashes of anger that
lead to tar and feathering and other tortuous punishments imposed by communities or victims and
replace such vengeful acts with a system of imprisonment and fines. Additionally, while the
reaction of a victim to a particular crime might range from mildly upset to murderous anger, the
law of retribution diffuses a single crime victim's reaction and intermingles it with the
community's range of reactions to that type of crime to arrive at a sentence that has community
acceptance, while at the same time taking into account the particular circumstance of that
particular instance of crime and, possibly, its victim.
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Retributive theory has been further criticized as focusing too much on
the ethical or moral basis for law, thereby punishing those who, as a
result of "physiological, psychological, environmental, cultural,
educational, economic, and hereditary factors," 2 6 1 may not commit

crimes because of their choice of evil over good but because of
desperate conditions like poverty or racial discrimination. 262 While
such concerns may undercut a retributive theory of punishment for
general crimes, they enhance the justification for punishment of those
offenders who commit white-collar crimes. 26 3 Those offenders whom
society has welcomed into its personal or financial affairs based upon
the faqade of respectability and trustworthiness projected by the
offenders seem the most culpable under a system of retribution. These
offenders, with the presumed ability to make the "right" choice
knowingly, demonstrate their
unwillingness to make that right choice by
264
choosing evil over good.
261. David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 396
(1976) (asserting that criminal law lacks a moral basis when it accepts social injustice).
262. Id. at 389, 401-02; see also Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 10
(1985) (stating that, unless we agree that offenders are criminals because they are poor, we must
consider that they may turn to crime because of their economic circumstances).
263. See Hart, supra note 255, at 415 (discussing the minimum obligations of responsible
citizens).
264. In an article addressing the issue of welfare criminology, Professor Stephen Morse
concluded:
[T]here is no scientifically dictated cutting point where legal and moral responsibility
begins or ends. Nor is there a higher moral authority which can tell society where to
draw the line. All society can do is determine the cutting point that comports with our
collective sense of morality. The real issue is where society ought to draw the line of
responsibility-and by whom it should be drawn.
Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1247, 1253 (1976). Critical race and feminist scholars have refocused Morse's question,
asserting that affluent white males are the ones who have drawn the lines to serve their own
political and economic self-interests-to the detriment of the poor, minorities, and women. See
supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not provide
an expansion to allow for private civil remedies).
A study of the crimes of the middle classes gives some support to this idea, finding that whitecollar crimes committed by whites cause more harm than white-collar crimes committed by nonwhites. See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 63, at 83; see also Dwight L. Greene, Abusive
Prosecutors: Gender, Race & Class Discretion and the Prosecution of Drug-Addicted Mothers,
39 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 780, 794-801 (1991) (recognizing that "for the most part, prosecutors are
a group of relatively privileged insider white males" and proposing that prosecutorial research,
information and reporting boards act as a check and balance to prosecutorial discretion and as an
informational source for the legislature and the public); Francisco Valdes, Diversity and
Discrimination in Our Midst: Musings on Constitutional Schizophrenia, Cultural Conflict, and
"Interculturalism" at the Threshold of a New Century, 5 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 293, 346-47
(1993) (contrasting the jurisprudential legalistic tradition that historically benefits favored groups
in the United States-"white, male, affluent, and heterosexual"-with the humanistic tradition
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Unfortunately, wealth heavily influences the use of legal process to
avoid indictment because it is often tied to the ability to hire excellent
counsel to address criminal allegations before they become criminal
charges. 2 65 Civil fines, restitution, and agreements to cooperate have 266
all
been used to avoid imprisonment or criminal punishment altogether.
Failing to secure complete avoidance, good counsel can limit the effects
through skillful negotiation of pleas. Faced with limited resources and
an uncertain outcome, prosecutors must consider resolutions without
trial. The Economic Crime Package recognizes the need to redress the
harm to victims of economic crime, tying the length of imprisonment to
both the number of victims harmed and the size of the loss imposed on
them. The retributive stamp of imprisonment recognizes the need to
''avenge" the devastation that economic crime can create but meets that
need with proportionality based on harm.
2. Deterrence
The potential for economic crime to find its way into every nook and
cranny of the United States capitalist system, with far-reaching and
devastating results, suggests that deterrence must be stepped up.
Arguably the Enrons of the new millennium are the reaction to the
perception of the insider trading and Savings and Loan scandals of the
1980s. 2 67 When the dust settled on those scandals, the famed actors
that benefits "people of color, women, the poor, and sexual minorities"). Women also have had
less of an opportunity to commit high-level white-collar criminality due at least in part to their
lack of representation in the upper hierarchies of organizations. See Kathleen Daly, Gender and
Varieties of White-Collar Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 769, 775 (1989) (contrasting the natures of
men's and women's white-collar illegalities).
265. See MANN, supra note 64, at 9 (noting that white-collar defense attorneys spend the
largest percentage of their work hours on precharge matters).
266. The history of imposing large fines or restitution in lieu of punishment for those with
wealth and power extends at least back to 2100 B.C. KLEIN, supra note 43, at 152. The Code of
Hammurabi provided for restitution for theft with a repayment of thirty-fold if the victim was "a
god . . . [or] . . . a palace," tenfold if the victim was "a villein," or, if the thief lacked means of
repayment, "he shall he put to death." Id. (quoting Cook, The Code of Hammurabi2100 B.C., in
TREASURY OF RULE OF LAW 25 (R. Nice ed. 1961)). King Louis IX of France perfected the fine
as an escape clause for a Sire DeCoucy, allowing him to avoid hanging after his fellow knights
exerted "enormous pressure." Id. at 153 (quoting B. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR 12-13
(1978)). Apparently the King recognized the dependency of his royal treasury on DeCoucy and
his fellow lords. Id. at 153-54.
Unfortunately, fines for pecuniary frauds undermine retributive goals. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 245 (5th ed. 1998) (recognizing that "the stigma effect of
being sentenced merely to pay a fine is slight").
267. See Calavita & Pontell, supra note 6, at 306-08, who posit that stepped-up enforcement
of white-collar crime is consistent with the structuralist theory that the state, in working to
maintain and protect economic stability, enjoys a greater measure of autonomy from the
individual elites and their consequential political pressure. The authors recognize, however, that
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walked away with little jail time and millions of dollars, while the
taxpayers continue to bail out the victims. 26 8 As discussed below, the
the state's inability to redress the Savings and Loan crisis early on suggests that autonomy comes
only when the immensity of the disaster becomes apparent. Id. at 306. Further, such autonomy is
short-lived in that its support dwindles as the crisis fades from public visibility. Id.
Manipulation of earnings by top corporate managers was already worrisome in 1999, prompting
Arthur Levitt, as chairman of the SEC, to announce in 1999 that he was committing the agency to
a high-priority attack on earnings management. Carol J. Loomis et al., Lies, Damned Lies, and
Managed Earnings: The Crackdown Is Here, FORTUNE, Aug. 2, 1999, at 74, available at 1999
WL 7940605. In an interview with Fortune, Levitt identified the current corporate practices as
threatening "the credibility of the U.S. financial-reporting system, traditionally thought to be the
best in the world." Id.
The initial reactions of politicians to the Enron collapse were outrage and disgust. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Joseph Kahn, Enron's Many Strands: The Hearings: Enron's Ex-Chief
Harshly Criticizedby Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at Al, availableat LEXIS, News
Library, The New York Times File (reporting on a "bipartisan oral barrage" from United States
senators directed at Kenneth L. Lay, former chairman of Enron, appearing before the Senate
Commerce Committee; one senator "told Mr. Lay he was 'perhaps the most accomplished
confidence man since Charles Ponzi.... I'd say you were a carnival barker, except that wouldn't
be fair to carnival barkers."'). Nonetheless, many of the reforms proposed to correct some of the
issues, such as lack of truly independent auditors and investment advisors and lack of accounting
regulation, have been left in the hands of the SEC through passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
See Ramirez, supra note 238, at 31-77. The risk in leaving such reforms to another day-and to
the oversight by the SEC-is that after the crisis fades, pressure can be brought to bear on an
agency that can cause a relaxation of regulatory oversight. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 237, at
562 n.356 (describing the SEC's reversal of position opposing private securities litigation reform
after "[s]enators 'threatened to turn off the lights' at the SEC").
268. In a plea agreement, Michael Milken, attributed with creating the junk-bond market,
agreed to pay over $600 million in fines and serve a ten-year term of imprisonment. He spent
only twenty-two months in jail as a result of a later sentencing departure by the court. Supra note
219 and accompanying text (discussing Milken's decreased sentence).
Ivan Boesky, under federal investigation for insider trading, cooperated with the government in
the criminal investigation, pled guilty, agreed to pay $100 million in fines and restitution (having
made an estimated $203 million in illegal securities trades), and received a three-year term of
imprisonment. ROSOFF ET AL., supra note 252, at 151-52.
Charles Keating's fraudulent conduct in the collapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan cost investors
more than $250 million and the taxpayers $3.4 billion. Prior to the federal indictment, Keating
called upon five United States senators to whom he had made substantial campaign contributions
to intervene with regulators on his behalf. The five senators became known as the "Keating
Five." Id. at 214-17. Keating was convicted on state charges related to the sale of junk bonds
and sentenced to the maximum term of ten years imprisonment; he was also convicted of federal
charges of racketeering, bank fraud, and other crimes and received a twelve year, seven month
term of imprisonment (less than half of the twenty-five to thirty year term requested by federal
prosecutors). The federal courts overturned both convictions on appeal. In a petition for habeas
corpus relief, the federal appellate court overturned the state conviction on an error in the jury
instructions; and the federal conviction was overturned when the appellate court held that the
federal jury had improperly learned about the prior state court conviction. Id. at 218-19. With
his convictions overturned, Keating was released in 1996. In 1999, Keating struck a deal with
federal prosecutors and pled guilty to wire fraud and concealment of assets with intent to defeat
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. He was sentenced to time already served in prison on the
overturned convictions (less than five years); no fine or restitution was imposed, and the court
dismissed pending charges of fraud against Keating's son. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Keating,
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financial and reputational harm to the offenders was significantly
outweighed by their financial gain; meanwhile, the costs were born
primarily by the taxpayers, thus affirming to those who might otherwise
be deterred, that crime does pay.
Michael Milken, Ivan Boesky, and Charles Keating faced the
criminal process in highly publicized cases intended not only to deter
those charged, but also to generally deter other white-collar
criminals. 269 Similarly, the recent, publicized arrests of executives at
Adelphia and WorldCom for fraud were
intended both to deter others
270
and feed the retributive call for justice.
Robert Merton, a contemporary of Edwin Sutherland, 271 wrote,
"contemporary American culture continues to be characterized by a
heavy emphasis upon wealth as a basic symbol of success, without a
corresponding emphasis on the legitimate avenues on which to march
toward this goal. 272 Where moral culture fails to impede criminal
conduct, 27 3 the law must step in to deter illegal conduct. According to

186 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1999); Press Release, United States Department of Justice, United
States Attorney's Office, Central District of California, Charles Keating Pleads Guilty to Federal
Fraud Charges, Four Criminal Convictions Resolve 10-Year-Old Case (April 6, 1999) (on file
with author), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/pr/072.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
269. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing the history of imposing large
fines or restitution).
270. Executives at WorldCom and Adelphia have been criminally charged. See supra note 18
and accompanying text (discussing the arrest of WorldCom executives). When the media portray
economic crime offenders as avoiding serious punishment, escaping justice, or receiving easy
sentences, the message communicated is that crime does pay. Media reports concerning Michael
Milken, for example, trumpet his twenty-two month prison stint despite a ten-year sentence
imposed. See, e.g., Milken Released from Jail, FINANCIAL POST (Toronto), Jan. 5, 1993, at 9;
Milken to Pay $47M in Civil Case, the Associated Press, NEWSDAY, Feb. 27, 1998, at A4;
Mulligan, supra note 219. Professor Coffee observes that media coverage reveals public support
for harsh prison terms for white-collar offenses. Coffee, supra note 251, at 236 (referring to the
media coverage of the criminal cases against Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken).
271. See supra note 72 (discussing the work of Edwin Sutherland).
272. Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, in SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL
STRUCTURE 131, 131-160 (1957). Robert Merton describes the strain toward anomie as follows:
When ...the cultural emphasis shifts from the satisfactions deriving from competition
itself to almost exclusive concern with the outcome, the resultant stress makes for the
breakdown of the regulatory structure. With this attenuation of institutional controls,
there occurs . . . a situation in which calculations of personal advantage and fear of
punishment are the only regulating agencies.
Id. at 157.
273. Whether one's motivation is to support a drug habit or a lavish lifestyle, the victims in
both instances suffer an economic loss. Likewise, the defenses of criminality by the offenders
are the same. In Profit Without Honor, the authors describe five commonly recognized
"neutralization techniques" used to justify criminal conduct. See ROSOFF ET AL., supra note 252,
at 401. A comparison of these techniques for both economic and street crimes yields similar
results: (1)Denial of responsibility: the economic offender asserts that there were overriding
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one commentator, "deterrence makes the most sense in situations where
the likelihood of apprehension is high, or where the targeted population
274
fears the prospective penalty and conforms its conduct accordingly."
Creating an empirical study to measure the effect of deterrence 2 75 and
thereby determine the optimal punishment or term of imprisonment for
an offense is difficult. Those who reject criminal conduct, despite
temptation and opportunity, are the true indicators of the success of
factors beyond her control, whereas the street crime offender asserts that no one would hire her;
(2) Denial of injury: the economic offender asserts that the crime caused no direct or overt
suffering, whereas the street crime offender asserts that he sells only to people who want to use;
(3) Denial of victim: the economic offender asserts that the victims deserved it because they did
not take care against crime, whereas the street crime offender asserts that the victims deserved it
because they should not have left their keys in a car in this neighborhood; (4) Appeal to higher
loyalties: the economic offender claims that the crime was an attempt to actualize a higher value
(for example, Oliver North and patriotism), whereas the street crime offender rationalizes that
selling drugs served a greater good because he was out of work and the money made paid the
heating bill and kept his children warm; (5) Condemning the condemners: both the economic
offender and the street crime offender claim to be victims of regulators, politicians, and
prosecutors. Id.; see also POVEDA, supra note 72, at 4-9 (comparing the myths of the "criminal
type" and the "law-abiding citizen").
274. Freed, supra note 43, at 1707 (discussing the ineffectiveness of punishment as a deterrent
when the offender does not believe that significant punishment is likely). See generally POSNER,
supra note 266, at 249 (constructing an economic equation to consider the effect of the
probabilities of apprehension and convictions on the marginal deterrence of increased terms of
imprisonment). One study has shown that in cheating on income taxes, the income most easily
traceable is the least likely to go unreported. In contrast, cash receipts that are difficult to trace
are the most likely to be unreported or under-reported. Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax
Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecutions, 23 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 209, 210, 237-38 (1989) (discussing a model constructed to test the influence of the
offender's perception of the probability of detection and criminal prosecution on intended
behavior).
275. The success of efforts to deter white-collar criminals cannot be measured by looking to
rates of prosecution because there are more white-collar crimes being committed than can be
prosecuted as a result of the level of resources devoted to that area of crime. This is true
generally throughout the criminal justice field as well. Indeed, while some may have looked to
the 1970s and 1980s as a white-collar crime wave, the real reason for the notoriety of white-collar
crime during that era was that the detection and prosecution of white-collar crime was made a
priority. See Kip Schlegel et al., Are White-Collar Crimes Overcriminalized? Some Evidence on
the Use of Criminal Sanctions Against Securities Violators, 28 W. ST. U. L. REV. 117, 140
(2000-2001) (study of securities violations from 1984 to 1991 to determine whether there has
been increased use of criminal sanctions and severity of punishment concluded length of
imprisonment remained relatively constant over period studied, fines imposed actually decreased
over the same period, and there was overall little support for the position that there is an
overcriminalization of business malfeasance). There was a "dramatic increase in securitiesrelated cases received during [that] time period, from 129 matters in 1984 to 424 in 1991," along
with a doubling in the number of securities offense-related convictions, but the authors note that
the increase in total volume could be the result of increased illegal behavior during the time
period studied or an increase in initiative by the SEC in investigating such crime. Id. at 133, 13940; see also John Braithwaite & Gilbert Geis, In Theory and Action for CorporateCrime Control,
in ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 189, 192-94 (Geis ed., 1992) (discussing the costs involved in
getting a conviction for white-collar crimes).
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deterrence.
People deciding not to engage in criminal conduct
ordinarily do not announce such decisions; thus, gathering empirical
evidence of successful deterrence is challenging. White-collar crime is
difficult to detect, 2 76 time-consuming to investigate, and costly to
prosecute, all resulting in less certainty of punishment. 2 77 If the
government meets its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt 278 and the defendant is convicted, low rates
of imprisonment or meager terms, as a result of departures, undermine
the message of deterrence directed at those who willingly and
knowingly have participated in similar activities but were not criminally
charged. 279 Thus, it is more reasonable for criminal sanctions to be
structured to encourage as much compliance with the law as possible.

276. See WEISBURD, ET AL., supra note 63, at 96 (the long duration of some white-collar
crimes supports theorists who have argued that many white-collar crimes go undetected for years
because their victims are unaware that they have been victimized); see generally Braithwaite &
Geis, supra note 275, at 190-91 (comparing the detectability of white-collar and traditional
crimes).
277. See MARCELLO MAESTRO, CESARE BECCARIA AND THE ORIGINS OF PENAL REFORM 29
(1973) (certainty of punishment rather than severity of punishment is the key influence in
deterring crime).
278. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in juvenile cases, just as in cases involving adults).
279. Several of the key officers and directors in the corporations, banks, and investment firms
that fell prey to accounting scandals were financial benefactors of the corporations at a time when
investors were losing the shirts off their backs. For example, Gary Winnick, Chairman of Global
Crossing and the former head of the convertible bonds department at Drexel Burnham Lambert
(who worked alongside Michael Milken), along with four of Winnick's former Drexel colleagues
at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, walked away with millions of dollars in profits and fees
from Global Crossing, leaving the corporation bankrupt and the shareholders empty-handed.
Geraldine Fabrikant & Simon Romero, How Executives Prospered as Global Crossing
Collapsed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at Cl, available at LEXIS, News Library, the New York
Times File; Christopher Palmeri et al., The Drexel Connection at Global Crossing, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 11, 2002, at 34, available at 2002 WL 9360257. A FinancialTimes investigation reports
that executives at the twenty-five largest United States public companies to go bankrupt since
January 2001 pulled in a cool $3.3 billion over two years. len Cheng, Inside Track-Survivors
Who Laughed All the Way to the Bank-Barons of Bankruptcy Part 1, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 31,
2002, at 8, available at 2002 WL 24873617. "The earnings figures comprise salary, bonuses,
other cash payments and share sales between January 1999 and December 2001." Id. (presenting
the Financial Times investigation into executive and director earnings at the twenty-five largest
United States public companies to go bankrupt since January 2001, including 181 executives and
twenty-seven directors). The top five earners averaged $255.6 million. Id. Large financial gains
alone are not proof of criminal conduct, but in the context of the unexpected bankruptcies and
devastating losses of these corporations, there is cause for concern about the legitimacy of the
personal gains of these actors. If economic crime reform is to be successful, it will have to
convey a tough-on-crime message to the would-be economic criminals. See Braithwaite & Geis,
supra note 275, at 195-200 (setting forth the dual propositions that deterrence is stronger for
corporate crime than traditional crime because economic criminals tend to be calculated risktakers and that incapacitation can be highly effective with economic criminals because their
criminal activity is dependent upon maintaining "legitimacy in formalized roles in the economy").
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The theory of general deterrence operates on the assumption that if
society punishes offenders who violate the law, others will not violate
the law because they do not wish to be punished.2 8 °
Longer imprisonment terms for white-collar offenders communicates
to the offender and others that the offender's behavior is not only

wrongful but also criminal, that it will not be tolerated by the
community, that the offender will now have to suffer the consequences,
and that such consequences will be severe. In contrast, "affirmance"
uses little or no imprisonment, communicating to the individual that
even when wrongful conduct is detected and successfully prosecuted,
the offender will endure a brief and unpleasant experience with the legal
process but will enjoy the handsome rewards of the profits derived from
the criminal venture. Affirmance thereby reinforces acceptance and,
perhaps, even envy of the criminal conduct. Obviously, affirmance is
not desirable in a sentencing scheme and conveys the worst message to
economic criminals. The principle explaining affirmance relies upon
the same theory supporting deterrence through longer terms of
imprisonment for white-collar offenders: the offender must not be told
simply that society has been wronged and that the offender must pay,
but rather that the offender is the wrongdoer and will suffer dire
consequences if such course of criminal action is pursued.
281
Key to the success of general deterrence is the act of punishment.
Liberty cannot be bought. Thus, imprisonment has a far greater bite
than fines. 282 The threat of losing privacy, freedom of movement, and
280. Pain and pleasure are the great springs of human action. When a man perceives or
supposes pain to be the consequence of an act, he is acted upon in such a manner as
tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him, as it were, from the commission of
that act. If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than the
apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the
consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from performing it. The
mischief which would have ensued from the act, if performed, will also by that
means be prevented.
JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, pt. 1I, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J. BENTHAM'S WORKS 396,
402 (J. Bowring ed. 1943), reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 116 (7th ed. 2001).
Even deterrence theory has its limits. See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Help Wanted: Economists, Crime
and Public Policy, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 16-18 (1996) (discussing the failure of contemporary
law and economic theory to consider the psychological characteristics of young street criminals
and the "intellectually idle" assumption that such criminals will analyze criminal punishment by
engaging in a rational cost-versus-benefit analysis worthy of "middle-aged economics
professors").
281. Punishment does not automatically entail imprisonment, nor solely require it. See supra
note 244 and accompanying text (discussing additional forms of punishment).
282. See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 200 (1965)
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the inability to determine one's daily routine for a term of years can be
an extraordinarily powerful deterrent. 2 83 Indeed, under an economic
theory, substantial prison terms as a general deterrent are more
justifiable in the white-collar crime arena than in a general crime arena
where many criminals
engage in crimes because of economic necessity
284
or cultural mores.
The Economic Crime Package purports to provide longer sentences
for those economic criminals who cause substantial harm; however, for
the reforms to be effective, courts must impose terms of imprisonment
that honor the carefully considered Guidelines amendments. Downward
departures that allow offenders to avoid imprisonment will disembowel
the economic crime reforms. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directs the
Sentencing Commission to review the Guidelines and amend them as
necessary to reflect the nature of the Act. Rather than a wholesale
change in the loss table, without an opportunity to observe the success
of the recently enacted reforms, this Article suggests that any additional
reform focus on downward departures as a means of providing the
deterrent effect that Congress is seeking.
D. Guided Departures
No matter what changes in criminal statutes are proposed or what
amendments to the Guidelines might follow, one thing is certain: so
long as unlimited departures from the applicable ranges from the
Guidelines are available, such changes will be largely ineffective. Prior
to adoption of the Economic Crime Package, courts imposed sentences
285
at the bottom end of the range for the majority of white-collar crimes,
suggesting that, while sentencing judges had adapted to the Guidelines'
sentencing ranges (at least when offered no plausible reason to depart

(observing that the question of imposing criminal sanctions for white-collar crime necessarily
involves the question of imprisonment compared to fines because fines can be imposed civilly
and, therefore, whether a monetary penalty is criminal or civil is irrelevant); Coffee, supra note
240, at 468 (finding that fines lack the deterrent value available through imprisonment because of
the ability to avoid payment, the difficulty in assessing a fine that meets the sanction of
imprisonment, and the ability of the defendant to pass on the cost).
283. "It is generally accepted today that fear of criminal prosecution is an effective deterrent
to businessmen, professional men, and the middle class." Ball & Friedman, supra note 282, at
216.
284. See Dilulio, supra note 280, at 16-17 (observing that for the street criminal who does not
expect to live to the age of thirty, an imprisonment term of thirty years for a crime will not act as
a general deterrent).
285. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (discussing support for imposing only civil
penalties for white-collar crimes).
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from them), they apparently were not prepared to impose the
significantly longer sentences recently adopted for mid- and high-dollar
crimes. 286 Moreover, while politicians seeking election vie to outdo
each other when addressing the evils of economic crime, district court
judges, who are not elected officials but are appointed for life, are
responsible for imposing sentences on the individual economic
criminals. Judges may not be comfortable with harsher terms of
imprisonment, especially if they view such convictions or harsher terms
as politically motivated rather than rational under traditional
justifications of retribution and deterrence.
The Economic Crime Package is supported by the purposes of
punishment. The meltdown in the financial markets over the spring and
summer of 2002 provides ample proof that economic crime has
extensive and costly consequences. 2 87 If the amended Guidelines are
286. As discussed above, the Criminal Law Committee ("CLC") of the Judicial Conference
supported the amendments. See Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg.
30,512, 30,542 (June 6, 2001); Bowman, 2001 Reforms, supra note 51, at 33-36, 37 & n.179
(describing the CLC's active participation in shaping the Economic Crime Package). The fact is,
however, that although the CLC strongly supported longer sentences, the Sentencing
Commission's data on economic criminals in theft, fraud, and tax cases where the loss exceeded
$1.5 million showed that judges more often did not "sentence these 'fat cat' defendants at the top
of the guideline range." Boss, supra note 104, at 125 (discussing data on sentences received in
theft and fraud cases). Approximately 25% of the defendants receive sentences in the bottom
quarter of the range, and less than 15% receive sentences in the top quarter of the range. Boss
cautions that these 1995 statistics do not reflect those sentenced under the Money Laundering
Guidelines, which result in more severe sentences. Id. at 125-26. As noted in Part I.B, there is a
high rate of downward departures in money laundering cases in which the underlying offense is
fraud. See supra notes 135, 137 and accompanying text (discussing downward departure rates for
non-drug related money laundering offenses).
In districts where downward departure rates are high, amendments imposing harsher terms of
imprisonment can be equally disregarded, resulting in sentences comparable to those imposed
prior to the Economic Crime Package as a result of the lack of guidance on the extent of
departures. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 53-55 tbl.26 The percentage of cases in
each federal district sentenced within the sentencing range and the percentage in which a
departure was applied, for example, the district of Arizona had a non-substantial assistance
downward departure rate of 63.5% and the southern district of California had a non-substantial
assistance downward departure rate of 48%. Id. By contrast, districts in the Fourth Circuit had
an average non-substantial assistance departure rate of 5%. Id.; see also supra Part Ill (discussing
the disparity in sentencing among districts and circuits); Bowman & Heise, supra note 48, at
1131-34 (suggesting that the high rates of departure in mandatory sentences for drug crimes is
related to the perception by judges and prosecutors that the sentences are too long and
disconnected from the purposes of punishment).
287. See, e.g., David Henry et al., The New Pinchfrom Pensions, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at
44 (noting that the dramatic drop in stock market value wiped out surpluses in many pensions and
will require larger contributions to meet commitments: "'The squeeze on U.S. pension funds has
the potential to be the defining U.S. financial crisis of the 2000s, like the savings and loan
squeeze of the 1980s"' (quoting Bob Prince, director of research and trading at money manager
Bridgewater Associates)), available at 2002 WL 9362554; Steven Rosenbush et al., Inside the
Telecom Game, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 34-40, available at 2002 WL 9362549 (describing
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applied to corporate executives who are convicted of fraud, theft, or
insider trading, then the resulting terms of imprisonment will be
serious, 288 at least if individual criminality can be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and the losses being reported in the newspapers 289 are
attributed to the individuals.
Unless departures can be limited, however, there is reason to believe
that the current trend toward increased departures will continue. 2 90 A
sentence is imposed upon an individual, and, as the Court in Koon
recognized, personalized sentencing is fundamental to the "federal
judicial tradition."291 Nonetheless, departure practices undermine the
Sentencing Guidelines when used so frequently that over one-third of
the cases are considered sufficiently extraordinary to support a
downward departure, with virtually half of those departures not based
on substantial assistance. The goal should be to narrow the extent of
downward departures applied to prescribed economic crime sentences
by limiting their use. One approach is to guide departures by limiting
the extent of the departure from the calculated offense level without
removing the discretionary authority of the judge to depart.
Under the SRA, Congress provided for limited appellate review of
sentences imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines. 29 2 Upon appellate
review, a court of appeals must determine whether the sentence "was
imposed in violation of law or imposed as a result of an incorrect
application of the sentencing guidelines ....
[or] ... is outside the
applicable guideline range and is unreasonable," giving "due regard to
the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, [and] due deference to the district court's application of the
guidelines to the facts." 29 3 Only the defendant may appeal an upward
departure decision, and only the government may appeal a downward
how a small group of insiders made billions of dollars as the telecom industry collapsed, with
stock prices falling over 95% from their highs and causing $2 trillion in investor losses).
288. For example, a conviction for insider trading has a base offense level of eight. U.S.S.G.
§ 2BI.4. If there is a gain over $5000, the amended loss table in § 2B1.1 is applied. Id. §
2B1.l(b)(1). If the gain is more than $20 million, the offense level is increased by twenty-two
levels to thirty. An offense level of thirty with no prior criminal history yields a sentencing range
of ninety-seven to 121 months. One might argue that eight to ten year's imprisonment is not
sufficiently harsh under a retributive theory for a crime worth $20 million; this Article, however,
addresses the need to make the current amendments to the Guidelines stick rather than the need
for higher levels of punishment.
289. See, e.g., supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing remedies under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
290. See supra Part IfI (discussing trends in sentencing departures).
291. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
292. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000).
293. Id. § 3742(d), (f)(1)-(2).
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departure decision. 294 Such appeals, however, are limited to the
decision to depart rather than to the extent of the departure from the
prescribed sentencing range. 295 The court's unfettered discretion
regarding the extent of a departure harkens back to the pre-Guidelines
era. A guided departure would not limit a court's discretion to depart,
but rather would guide the permitted degree of variance from the
296
prescribed sentencing range.
Under the guided departures proposed here, a justification that
warranted departure would permit the court to exercise discretion and
depart downward but would guide such departure by restraining the
court from departing downward by more than 20% from the bottom end
of the recommended range 29 7 or by two offense levels, whichever is
less. 298 A 20% guide would be a marked restraint in economic crime
294. Id. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3).
295. The decision against departure is wholly within the district court's discretion unless such
a decision is based upon a mistaken interpretation of the law. United States v. Atkinson, 259 F.3d
648, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153, 1160-61 (10th Cir.
2001); United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688, 699 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1028
(2000); United States v. Graham, 146 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Khalil, 132
F.3d 897, 898 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Guidelines include "numerical or non-numerical suggestions" by the Sentencing
Commission as guidance for some departures, with the expectation that appellate courts "may
prove more likely to find departures 'unreasonable' where they fall outside suggested levels."
U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A.4(b). Nevertheless, the Sentencing Commission recognizes that these are
"suggestions" only, that there are other grounds for departures, and that there may be reasons not
to follow the Sentencing Commission's suggestions. Id.
296. Guided departures would' therefore, virtually eliminate 100% departure medians. See
supra note 295 and accompanying text (citing examples of courts' departure from sentences
based on discretion).
297. The bottom end of the range is used because if the court is considering a downward
departure, presumably the court finds that the lowest end of the range is higher than the term of
imprisonment the court deems appropriate in the case.
298. At the upper levels of the sentencing table, guided departures would result in a decrease
in the offense level by two levels. For example, at an offense level of thirty with no criminal
history, the range would decrease from a minimum sentence of ninety-seven months to a
minimum sentence of seventy-eight months. Thus, the departure would lessen the sentence by up
to nineteen months. Practically applied, the 20% guide would be applied at the lower end of the
sentencing table. At an offense level of nine with no criminal history, the range would decrease
by twenty-four days from a minimum term of four months to just over three months. See
U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table; id. § 5BIl..
Such a term would fall between offense
levels eight and nine and between zones A and B. Id. § 5BI.I. Thus, a guided departure
schedule would need to specify whether such a departure should fall into zone A, which would
make a defendant eligible for probation only, or zone B, which would permit probation, but only
in conjunction with imposition of "a condition or combination of conditions requiring intermittent
confinement, community confinement, or home detention." Id. § 5Bl.l(a)(2). Within zone A,
the sentencing ranges are zero to six months. Id. If the sentence falls below zone B's lowest
sentence of 4 months, the upper end of the range from which to depart should apply the 20%
limitation as well. Id. In the example above, the upper end of the offense level nine range is ten;
if reduced by 20%, the upper end would be eight. Id. Under guided departures, the 20%
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sentences, given the median departure rate of virtually 100%.299 The
purpose of the guided departures, however, is to limit the nullification
of terms of imprisonment for economic crime offenders. Based upon
the revised loss table of the Fraud and Theft Guideline, those offenders
who commit relatively minor pecuniary frauds would fall in or near the
zones eligible for imprisonment alternatives. For those whose crimes
involve greater amounts, the guided departures would impose greater
restraint. Because it is the deterrent effect that is most sought out in this
300
Moreover, the 20%
area of crime, certainty of punishment is critical.
guide would not, practically speaking, be the limit for some offenders,
because, as the Sentencing Commission Sourcebook reveals, multiple
reasons are applied in some departure cases. 3° 1 Needless to say, those
offenders most able to afford good defense counsel to raise reasons for
criminals whom the guided departures
departures are the white-collar
3 2
would seek to restrain. 0
The Koon case highlights the fact that a court may find
several reasons 303 to support a downward departure. Under such
circumstances, each supported reason for a departure would permit an
downward departures should remain in the higher zone until the full range falls within the lower
zone's outer perimeter. In this example, that would be six.
299. In fact, nearly all of the primary offense categories listed in Table 31 of the 2000
Sourcebook reflect median percent decreases from the Guideline minimum of greater than 20%.
Downward Departure Cases: Degree of Departure for Offenders in Each Primary Offense
Category, Fiscal Year 2000, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 62 tbl.31 (reviewing only nonsubstantial assistance downward departures, with medians ranging from a low of a 19.6%
decrease in the Kidnapping/Hostage Taking primary offense category up to a 100% decrease for
the Auto Theft primary offense category). This Article focuses on white-collar crime and does
not examine the application of guided departures to all primary offense categories; the departure
medians, however, arguably support consideration of guided departures or a reconciliation of
sentencing guidelines and sentencing practices. Guided departures may be too limiting in
instances of mandatory minimum sentencing cases, such as some narcotics offenses. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 953 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (granting a mother, with no prior
criminal history and no relatives available who could care for children, a six-level downward
departure to an eighteen to twenty-four month term of imprisonment from mandatory minimum
of five years, where her seven-year-old daughter had repeatedly attempted suicide in the foster
care system after her mother's arrest for a minor role in a drug trade).
300. See MAESTRO, supra note 277, at 29.
301. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at A-9 (explaining that "courts often provide
more than one reason for departure"). The Sentencing Commission Sourcebook reported 10,288
reasons for non-substantial assistance downward departures in 8903 cases in fiscal year 2000.
See id. at 52 tbl.25 n.2 (Reasons for Downward Departures).
302. See supra notes 64, 219, 265 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of
private counsel for white-collar criminals and the district courts' ability to depart from sentencing
subject only to an abuse of discretion standard of review by appellate courts).
303. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 52 tbls.24, 25 (listing the reasons given by
sentencing courts in fiscal year 2000 for upward and downward departures in cases in which
substantial assistance was not the reason for downward departure).
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additional downward departure so that two reasons might result in up to
a four-level decrease in the offense level. 304 Again, at the lower ranges
of the sentencing table, the 20% rule would apply. Two independent
justifications for a downward departure, however, would not equal a
40% decrease. Rather, the range would be decreased by 20%, and then
the new range would be eligible for a decrease of up to 20% 30if5 the court
deemed that the facts supported a second basis for departure.
Alternatively, the guided departure scheme proposed above could
apply only to substantial assistance departure cases. Indeed, substantial
assistance departures account for just over half of all departures from
the Sentencing Guidelines.
Commentators, like Professor Frank
Bowman, have suggested that prosecutors were given a great deal of
power in the federal sentencing scheme as a result of the section 5Kl.I
substantial assistance departure and have not used such authority
judiciously. 306 On the other hand, the conventional wisdom is that

304. Applying guided departures to the Koon case, there would be a six-level decrease
because the Court affirmed three independent reasons for a downward departure: (1) victim
misconduct; (2) susceptibility to abuse in prison; and (3) successive prosecutions. Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111-12 (1996). The original sentencing range was seventy to eightyseven months. For the first reason, fourteen months (70 x 20%) would be the maximum
departure, resulting in a lower end of fifty-six months. A two-level decrease in the Sentencing
Table would result in a lower range of fifty-seven months. Since fifty-seven is a lesser departure
than fifty-six, the two-level decrease would be applied, and the range would now be fifty-seven to
seventy-one months. For the second departure, the 20% calculation would result in a low-end
range of 45.6 months, whereas the two-level decrease would be forty-six months, so the two-level
decrease would be applied for a sentencing range of forty-six to fifty-seven months. If the court
wished to depart further (and given that the sentencing court departed down to thirty months, it
can be assumed that the court would), the third reason would be employed as a basis for a
downward departure from the forty-six to fifty-seven month range. Twenty percent would yield a
thirty-seven month lower end, and a two-level departure would yield a thirty-seven month lower
end. Thus, the final sentencing range, applying all three bases for departure, would be thirtyseven to forty-six months, or seven months higher than the Koon court determined was
appropriate.
305. Continuing the example in footnote 298, a defendant would have to provide at least three
reasons for departure to bring an offense level of nine down to zone A. The sentencing range for
an offense level of nine, with no criminal history, is four to ten months. The first reason for
departure would result in a range of ninety-six days to eight months; the second reason would
yield a range of seventy-seven days to 192 days; and the third reason would yield a range of
sixty-two days to 154 days. At this point, the entire range would fall within zone A (zero to six
months), and the defendant would be eligible for probation only. See supra note 298 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of downward sentencing departures).
306. Bowman, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow, supra note 217, at 49 nn.238-39, 62-66
(noting that there has been some suggestion that external limitations be imposed upon
prosecutorial discretion in bargaining with potential cooperating witnesses). The Sentencing
Commission gathers the statistical data on sentencing for review on a national basis and also
separates the statistics on a district-by-district basis. 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 53-55
tbl.26. Those individual district statistics reveal that sentencing range departures based upon
substantial assistance vary considerably, from a low of 7.2% in the District of Arizona to a high
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some authority to negotiate punishment must be available to prosecutors
as an effective tool in law enforcement to enlist the cooperation of
otherwise unwilling witnesses or participants. 30 7 Given the present
climate of widespread disgust with white-collar criminals, there should
be external pressure on prosecutors to avoid deal cutting and, perhaps, a
greater expectation that juries will be less forgiving of corporate
misdeeds. Even if a similar guided departure system were implemented
in substantial assistance departures, such a guide would differ 30 8 from
the proposal here in order to take into account the extent of assistance
provided and the cooperating witness' role in the criminal conduct. As
discussed above, statistics show a 42.3% increase in downward
departure rates in non-substantial assistance fraud cases. 30 9 The
complexity of developing a guide that would account for various levels
of 50.9% in the Northern District of New York. Id. This broad range suggests at a minimum that
the Department of Justice is not applying similar standards for substantial assistance departures
throughout the country. Martin, supra note 203, at 262 (noting the wide disparity in the exercise
of departure power under sections 5Kl.1 and 5K2.0). Moreover, it is beyond belief that one out
of every two cases brought in the Northern District of New York warrants a substantial assistance
departure. See, e.g., Bowman, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow, supra note 217, at 59-60
(discussing the failure of government lawyers to use substantial assistance motions across
districts).
307. See, e.g., Bowman, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow, supra note 217, at 49-50
(suggesting that the social utility of obtaining convictions outweighs the costs of deviations from
substantially proportional sentencing); Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal
Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992) (tracing back to English roots the legal history of
sentence bargaining to enlist the cooperation of co-defendants); Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 547-550, 552 (1992)
(identifying charge bargaining and Guidelines factor bargaining by prosecutors, but cautioning
that "[i]n a clear majority of cases AUSAs negotiate plea agreements in compliance with the
tenets of the guidelines.... Guideline circumvention is not the norm."); Ronald S. Safer &
Matthew C. Crowl, SubstantialAssistance Departures: Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon? 12
FED. SENT. REP. 41, 42 (1999) (describing the "confluence" of section 5Kl.1 substantial
assistance departures and the mandatory minimum drug sentences as creating "powerful
incentives" for witness cooperation despite the risk of retaliation by gangmembers in the Chicago
crackdown on the "Gangster Disciple" street gang); David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the
Prosecutor's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 526 (1999) (asserting that the need for
accomplice testimony in the prosecution of certain kinds of cases has been "conventional wisdom
for generations").
As Judge Frankel has observed, "The people who always hated plea bargaining and wanted it
abolished [in the pre-Guidelines era] still hate it. But now they hate bargaining under the
guidelines and talk as though this strengthens their position." Frankel & Orland, supra note 43, at
666.
308. See Bowman, DepartingIs Such Sweet Sorrow, supra note 217, at 64-66 (suggesting that
the Justice Department should adopt internal guidelines for substantial assistance cases before
Congress moves in to restrain federal prosecutorial power).
309. See supra notes 209-15 and accompanying text (discussing sentencing departure rates in
fraud convictions). The 17% non-substantial assistance departure rate encompasses all offense
categories, not just white-collar offenses. See 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 51 fig.G.
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of cooperation is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, the guided
departures proposed here would be limited to non-substantial assistance
downward departures. Arguably then, this proposal closes the door
only halfway, because it leaves open opportunities for the substantial
assistance departure.
One concern with guided departures is the potential for defense
counsel and judges to create or accept more reasons for departure so that
the combination of reasons will substantially lower the ultimate
sentence. 3 10
Certainly, creative defense lawyers will advance
justifications to lower the sentences of their clients, but convincing a
court that several "extraordinary" reasons are applicable in a single case
should present a greater obstacle than establishing a single basis for an
unlimited downward departure. 3 11 Guided departures would permit a
court to deviate from the strictures of the Guidelines without entirely
abandoning the underlying goals of uniformity and fairness.
Those critics who already despair over the rigidity of the Sentencing
Guidelines will no doubt shudder at the prospect of restraining one of
the few remaining strongholds of judicial discretion in federal
sentencing practice. 12 This proposal, however, is purposefully based
and judicially efficient. As discussed above, the recent enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a clear message from Congress that economic
crime offenders should be punished with imprisonment. 3 13 Moreover,
the Economic Crime Package was a considered acknowledgment that
longer sentences are needed to deter and punish economic crime.
Imposing terms of imprisonment that truly communicate the message of
deterrence and affect the aims of retribution are precisely what guided
departures ought to do.
Permitting unrestrained and extensive
departures will, over time, obliterate the uniformity of the Guidelines.
Allowing appellate review of every departure decision will overwhelm

310. The 2000 Sourcebook identified twenty-seven frequently specified reasons given for the
downward departures, in addition to 1077 "other" less-commonly given reasons. See 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 52 tbl.25. A reason was specifically identified when there were
at least twenty cases in which that reason was noted as supporting the departure. "The 'other'
category includes all reasons provided fewer than twenty times among relevant cases." Id. at 55
n.2.
311. The more extreme or outrageous the departure reason, the greater the likelihood it could
be determined to be an abuse of discretion by the appellate court. Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81, 113 (1996); see supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's decision in Koon).
312. See supra note 43 (providing a survey of commentators attacking the rigidity of the
Guidelines).
313. See supra Part I1.C (discussing the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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the judiciary. 3 14 In 2000, non-substantial assistance departures were the
second highest Guidelines-related
issue raised on appeal by either the
3 15
defendant or the government.
The guided departure proposal presented above strives to reflect the
intent of Congress in enacting the SRA, as well as the Supreme Court's
concern that the Sentencing Guidelines are a constitutional exercise in
federal authority that respects the due process concerns of its citizens.
Early attacks on the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines were
put to rest in the case of Mistretta v. United States,3 16 which upheld the
constitutionality of the delegation of Congressional authority in the
formulation of the Sentencing Guidelines under the SRA. In creating
the Sentencing Guidelines, the terms of the SRA recognized the need to
consider individual circumstances in sentencing procedures 3 17 where
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that
described. 3 18
With the enabling statute, Congress established the Sentencing
Commission, giving it the authority to develop sentencing guidelines,
policy statements, and official commentary for courts to consider in
determining when a factor is sufficiently unusual to support a departure.
As discussed above in Part 1II, the Sentencing Commission exercised
314. See Berman, supra note 43. at 100-04. Professor Berman presents a compelling
argument for refocusing departure jurisprudence on the extent of the departures rather than on the
decision to depart. He argues that the current sentencing matrix causes too much wasteful effort
on scouring the Guidelines for loopholes that can be used to affect targeted sentences and neglects
the opportunity to return sentencing analysis to traditional criminal theory addressing the
purposes of punishment. Id. at 69-72.
Berman suggests that minor departures from the
sentencing table "create no greater disparity concerns than the unregulated discretion that district
judges already have to select sentences from within applicable sentencing ranges." Id. at 98.
Even with a two-level departure, however, Berman cautions that the sentencing court must be
required to articulate a purposeful reason for the departure and that such a departure should not
escape appellate review. Id. at 100. Such a review would extend the limited appellate review
permitted by Congress under the SRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000). As discussed in Part I,supra,
the SRA provided for limited appellate review where virtually none existed before. This Article
posits that broadening appellate review would overrun the courts with appeals, without
necessarily providing greater guidance as to appropriate levels of departure. See supra notes
175-77 (citing the disparate findings in assessing matters like family ties and charitable service as
support for a departure).
315. See Guideline Involved in Issues Appealed by the Defendants, 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 47, at 108 tbl.57; Guideline Involved in Issues Appealed by the Government, 2000
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 47, at 109 tbl.58.
316. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989).
317. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (2000 & West Supp. 2002); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000 & West Supp. 2002).

426

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 34

such authority in limiting certain factors that could never be the basis
for departure, 3 19 as well as factors that should not "ordinarily" be

considered. 320 Thus, the SRA does not prevent the proposed limitations
on departure authority.
Further, the SRA established that appellate courts may review

sentencing

decisions. 32 1

This limited

appellate review permits

defendants to appeal upward departures and the government to appeal
downward departures 322 but does not permit appellate courts to infringe
upon the "traditional deference" afforded a district court's exercise of
discretion. 323 Providing for guided departures would not take away a
court's ability to determine that a departure is warranted by the
existence of a particular fact that falls outside the heartland of a

guideline given all of the facts of a case. 3 24 In a guided departure, the
extraordinary circumstance would still serve as the basis of the
departure, with the Guidelines merely placing an outer325limit on how far
the departure could deviate from the sentencing range.
V.

CONCLUSION

The 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments to the Sentencing
Guidelines coincided with the revelation of widespread corporate fraud
that has caused the value of America's financial markets to plunge,
sending shock waves through the country. Lost pensions, jobs, and
trillions of dollars in market value highlight the need for criminal
sentences that reflect the retributive purposes of America's justice
319. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text (listing factors that should never be taken
into account for departing from the Guidelines).
320. See supra notes 166-75 (discussing factors not ordinarily relevant in determining if a
sentence should be outside the applicable range); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 93 (determining
what factors should be considered in downward sentencing departures).
321. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000 & West Supp. 2002).
322. Id. § 3742(a)-(b); Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.
323. Koon, 518 U.S. at 97 (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 205 (1992)); see
also Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (upholding the congressional authority
to formulate sentencing guidelines).
324. Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100 (identifying the relevant question in determining appellate
standard of review).
325. The guided departure would be a measure of discretion in addition to the sentencing
court discretion encompassed within each offense level range. See Bowman, Quality of Mercy,
supra note 43, at 713. Each sentence imposed within the calculated offense level would provide
25% movement within the upper and lower ends of that range to accommodate individual
considerations of the unique "human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the
crime and punishment to ensue." Koon, 518 U.S. at 113; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2000),
amended by 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, § 11008, 116 Stat. 1758, 1819 (2002); see also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(2) (discussing the
statutory mission of the guidelines).

2003] Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 427
system, as well as the need for specific and general deterrence of
economic crimes. The diminishment of civil remedies for economic
wrongdoing has created a vacuum in restraint through civil
enforcement; criminal enforcement must now replace the deterrent
effect lost in the remedial shuffle. The 2001 amendments to the loss
table of the combined fraud and theft sentencing guidelines, enacted to
promote longer terms of imprisonment for high-dollar economic crime,
are carefully crafted and purposefully based. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
addressing corporate and accounting fraud, directs the Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the Guidelines to reflect the nature of
the Act. Rather than further enhance well-considered increases in
imprisonment terms for large-scale fraud, the Sentencing Commission
should address the rise in non-substantial assistance downward
departures, which threatens the effectiveness of the reforms.
Implementing a system of guided departures for economic crimes, as
proposed above, would lessen the thundercloud posed by the increase in
downward departures, strengthen the amendments, and support the new
legislation's battle against economic crime.

